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THE LAWFULNESS OF THE FIFTEENTH
AMENDMENT
Travis Crum*
One of the most provocative debates in constitutional theory concerns the
lawfulness of the Reconstruction Amendments’ adoptions. Scholars have contested
whether Article V permits amendments proposed by Congresses that excluded the
Southern States and questioned whether those States’ ratifications were obtained
through unlawful coercion. Scholars have also teased out differences in how States
were counted for purposes of ratifying the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments.
This debate has focused exclusively on the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments,
dismissing the Fifteenth Amendment as a mere sequel.
As this Essay demonstrates, the Fifteenth Amendment’s ratification raises unique
issues and adds important nuance to this debate. New York rescinded its ratification
at a time that is difficult to ignore. The Indiana state legislature lacked a quorum
when it approved the amendment. Georgia was expelled from the Union after Congress
had readmitted it in July 1868. Georgia was then required to ratify the Fifteenth
Amendment as a fundamental condition for its second readmission. Georgia’s
situation differs substantially from the Southern States that were consistently excluded
from the Union. Under any theory—whether it endorses a loyal, reduced, or full
denominator—at least one of these States’ ratifications is necessary for the Fifteenth
Amendment’s validity.
Notwithstanding these issues, the Fifteenth Amendment’s legality is on solid
ground. Indeed, the Fifteenth Amendment showcases Reconstruction’s success. The

© 2022 Travis Crum. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Essay in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes, so
long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review,
and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Associate Professor of Law, Washington University in St. Louis. For helpful
comments and conversations, I would like to thank Bruce Ackerman, Akhil Amar, Vik Amar,
Will Baude, Noah Bokat-Lindell, Tom Colby, Laura Edwards, Dan Epps, Cary Franklin,
Chris Green, Craig Green, John Harrison, Andrea Katz, Elizabeth Katz, Kurt Lash, Greg
Magarian, Gerard Magliocca, Kate Masur, Joshua Matz, Jason Mazzone, David Pozen, Brad
Rebeiro, Chris Schmidt, Arin Smith, and Rebecca Zietlow, as well as participants at this
Symposium, the National Conference of Constitutional Law Scholars at the University of
Arizona James E. Rogers College of Law, the Conference on the Reconstruction
Amendments at the University of Chicago Law School, and the faculty workshop at
Washington University in St. Louis. I also thank Caitlin Hawkins and Julian Scott for
excellent research assistance and the editors of the Notre Dame Law Review for their diligent
work.

1543

1544

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 97:4

majority of Southern States were represented in the Congress that passed the Fifteenth
Amendment and those States ratified it free of any fundamental conditions. Given the
demographics and political realities of Reconstruction, the Fifteenth Amendment was
the first constitutional provision whose ratification was clearly attributable to the votes
of black men under a reduced- or full-denominator theory. More broadly, the fight to
ratify the Reconstruction Amendments demonstrates that democracies must sometimes
take extraordinary steps to protect themselves from secessionist, racist, and antidemocratic forces.
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INTRODUCTION
The Fifteenth Amendment is the forgotten Reconstruction
Amendment. Even though it prohibited racial discrimination in
voting and enfranchised black men nationwide, 1 “the Fifteenth
[Amendment] plays only a minor role in modern constitutional law.”2
The Fifteenth Amendment has receded from view because its
constitutional protections have been usurped by the Fourteenth
Amendment and because most voting rights litigation is brought
under the Voting Rights Act (VRA). 3 As such, a host of doctrinal
questions remain unanswered concerning the Fifteenth Amendment.4
Although legal scholarship on the Fifteenth Amendment is by no
means non-existent, it “has been relatively rare.” 5

1 U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color,
or previous condition of servitude.”).
2 ERIC FONER, THE SECOND FOUNDING: HOW THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION
REMADE THE CONSTITUTION 170 (2019).
3 See Travis Crum, The Superfluous Fifteenth Amendment?, 114 NW. U. L. REV. 1549,
1564–65 (2020) [hereinafter Crum, Superfluous].
4 See id. at 1560–63 (discussing uncertainty over whether the Fifteenth Amendment
has an intent requirement or encompasses vote-dilution claims); see also id. at 1623–26
(arguing that Katzenbach’s rationality standard governs Congress’s Fifteenth Amendment
enforcement authority).
5 Kurt Lash, The Fight for Black Suffrage: Documenting the History of the Fifteenth
Amendment, ELECTION L. BLOG: ELB BOOK CORNER (Aug. 11, 2021), https://
electionlawblog.org/?p=123855 [https://perma.cc/CV5U-TRNY].
Several scholars, myself included, have written on the Fifteenth Amendment. See
Vikram David Amar & Alan Brownstein, The Hybrid Nature of Political Rights, 50 STAN. L. REV.
915, 928–55 (1998) (arguing that Shaw claims are inconsistent with the Fifteenth
Amendment); Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Colorblindness, Race Neutrality, and Voting Rights, 51
EMORY L.J. 1397, 1425 (2002) (“[T]he Fifteenth Amendment should not be viewed as
merely adding the right to vote to the list of other rights to be protected under the
Constitution and . . . the Fourteenth Amendment.”); Travis Crum, Reconstructing Racially
Polarized Voting, 70 DUKE L.J. 261, 314–20 (2020) [hereinafter Crum, Reconstructing]
(criticizing the Court’s treatment of racially polarized voting as inconsistent with the
Fifteenth Amendment’s historical context); Crum, Superfluous, supra note 3, at 1602–17
(discussing the Fortieth Congress’s decision to pass a constitutional amendment rather
than a nationwide suffrage statute); WILLIAM GILLETTE, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: POLITICS AND
THE PASSAGE OF THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT 78 (Johns Hopkins Paperbacks ed. 1969)
(arguing that the Fifteenth Amendment’s “primary objective [was] the enfranchisement of
the northern Negro”); Emma Coleman Jordan, Taking Voting Rights Seriously: Rediscovering
the Fifteenth Amendment, 64 NEB. L. REV. 389, 440–42 (1985) (arguing that the Fifteenth
Amendment encompasses racial vote dilution claims and permits race-conscious remedies);
EARL M. MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND CONGRESS, 1863–1869, at 142–56
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Kurt Lash’s new collection of primary sources cataloguing the
adoption of the Reconstruction Amendments puts the Fifteenth
Amendment on more equal footing. 6 This comprehensive collection
should encourage scholarly research and judicial inquiry into our
nation’s constitutional commitment to ending racial discrimination in
voting. As part of this symposium honoring Lash’s magisterial and
thorough collection, this Essay uses sources highlighted in his
collection to contribute to a long-standing debate in constitutional
theory concerning the lawfulness of the Reconstruction Amendments’
adoptions.
This debate stems from various irregularities associated with these
Amendments’ drafting and ratification and whether these deficiencies
violated Article V’s requirements that amendments pass Congress by a
two-thirds vote of both houses and be ratified by three-fourths of the
States. The Congresses that passed the Reconstruction Amendments
excluded the Southern States. Moreover, the Southern States’
ratifications were arguably coerced by these exclusions and by the
imposition of fundamental conditions on their readmission to the
Union. Congress also played fast-and-loose with how it counted States
for purposes of Article V’s denominator: the rump Thirty-Ninth
Congress counted the Southern States for purposes of ratifying the
Thirteenth Amendment while excluding those States from
representation when it passed the Fourteenth Amendment. Finally,
two Northern States rescinded their ratifications prior to the
Fourteenth Amendment’s addition to the Constitution. 7
This Essay engages with the historical and scholarly theories
developed to justify these irregularities. These theories can be divided
into so-called loyal-denominator, reduced-denominator, and fulldenominator theories—that is, they differ in how they treat the
Southern States for purposes of Article V.

(1990) [hereinafter MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS] (claiming that the Fifteenth Amendment
prohibits only facially discriminatory laws).
Recent scholarship on Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment has also helped
shed light on the similarly worded Fifteenth Amendment. See generally Gabriel J. Chin,
Reconstruction, Felon Disenfranchisement, and the Right to Vote: Did the Fifteenth Amendment
Repeal Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment?, 92 GEO. L.J. 259 (2004); Gerard N. Magliocca,
Our Unconstitutional Reapportionment Process, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 774 (2018); Earl M.
Maltz, The Forgotten Provision of the Fourteenth Amendment: Section 2 and the Evolution of
American Democracy, 76 LA. L. REV. 149 (2015); Michael T. Morley, Remedial Equilibration and
the Right to Vote Under Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 2015 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 279; Franita
Tolson, What is Abridgment?: A Critique of Two Section Twos, 67 ALA. L. REV. 433 (2015).
6 1 THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS: THE ESSENTIAL DOCUMENTS (Kurt T. Lash
ed., 2021) [hereinafter LASH, Vol. 1]; and 2 THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS: THE
ESSENTIAL DOCUMENTS (Kurt T. Lash ed., 2021) [hereinafter LASH, Vol. 2].
7 See infra Section I.A.
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During Reconstruction, several Radical Republicans claimed that
the Southern States should not be counted for Article V’s
“denominator” and therefore only the ratifications of loyal States
mattered. 8 The Radicals’ theory was never clearly endorsed by the
Reconstruction Congress for purposes of Article V. 9 In modern times,
Akhil Amar 10 and Christopher Green 11 have endorsed the Radicals’
approach. Because the scholarly discussion has focused on the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, these theories have not
grappled with how to count readmitted Southern States for purposes
of the Fifteenth Amendment’s ratification. 12 Accordingly, I clarify this
debate by differentiating between a loyal-denominator theory, which
looks only at those States that stayed in the Union, and a reduceddenominator theory, which incorporates readmitted States.
Turning to full-denominator theories, modern scholars have
defended the Reconstruction Congress’s actions. 13 Drawing on his
dualist theory of constitutional change, Bruce Ackerman contends that
the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments violated Article V’s
requirements. But for Ackerman, this is a feature, not a bug:
Ackerman argues that Congress’s questionable compliance with
Article V is evidence of higher lawmaking, akin to what occurred
8 See infra subsection I.B.1.
9 See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 368 (2005)
[hereinafter AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION] (noting that the reduced-denominator
theory “was never the official policy of the Reconstruction Congress”).
10 See id. at 367 (calculating a “true-blue” ratification for the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments).
11 See Christopher R. Green, The History of the Loyal Denominator, 79 LA. L. REV. 47, 50
(2018) [hereinafter Green, Loyal Denominator] (“The disloyal South was not entitled to
resume its Article I and Article V powers . . . until Congress was satisfied with reestablished
Southern loyalty.”).
12 See infra notes 150–54 and accompanying text (discussing how Amar and Green
treat Tennessee for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification).
13 Since Ackerman reignited this debate, a considerable literature has developed on
the irregular adoption of the Reconstruction Amendments. See Gabriel J. Chin & Anjali
Abraham, Beyond the Supermajority: Post-Adoption Ratification of the Equality Amendments, 50
ARIZ. L. REV. 25, 25–26 (2008); Thomas B. Colby, Originalism and the Ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1627, 1627 (2013); David P. Currie, The
Reconstruction Congress, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 383, 383–84 (2008); Green, Loyal Denominator,
supra note 11, at 48; Christopher R. Green, Loyal Denominatorism and the Fourteenth
Amendment: Normative Defense and Implications, 13 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 167, 168
(2017) [hereinafter Green, Normative Defenses]; Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen,
Is West Virginia Unconstitutional?, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 291, 293 (2002); DAVID E. KYVIG, EXPLICIT
AND AUTHENTIC ACTS: AMENDING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, 1776–2015, at 154–87 (reprt.
ed. 2016); Jason Mazzone, Unamendments, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1747, 1747–48 (2005); David E.
Pozen & Thomas P. Schmidt, The Puzzles and Possibilities of Article V, 121 COLUM. L. REV.
2317, 2347–51 (2021); Douglas H. Bryant, Comment, Unorthodox and Paradox: Revisiting the
Ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, 53 ALA. L. REV. 555, 555–56 (2002).
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during the New Deal. 14 For his part, Akhil Amar has also articulated a
full-denominator theory that justifies Congress’s exclusion of the
South and its use of fundamental conditions by pointing to Article IV’s
Guarantee Clause. 15 Finally, John Harrison draws on international law
principles to argue that de facto governments can make decisions that
bind their successors. 16 Notwithstanding these scholars’ lengthy
discussions of this topic, their arguments virtually ignore the Fifteenth
Amendment. 17
Although the Reconstruction Amendments shared some
irregularities, 18 the Fifteenth presents unique problems. Consider
New York, which purported to rescind its ratification. 19 Although this
problem emerged during the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification, 20
it was either tardy or mooted, depending on your theory. 21 Next up is
Indiana, where the state legislature lacked a quorum when it ratified
14 See 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 100–252 (1998)
[hereinafter ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS]; infra subsection I.B.2.
15 See AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 9, at 364–80; see also Akhil Reed
Amar, Essay, The Lawfulness of Section 5—and Thus of Section 5, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 109, 111–
15 (2013) (analogizing the VRA’s preclearance regime to the Fourteenth Amendment’s
ratification process); Akhil Reed Amar, Lindsey Ohlsson Worth & Joshua Alexander
Geltzer, Reconstructing the Republic: The Great Transition of the 1860s, in TRANSITIONS: LEGAL
CHANGE, LEGAL MEANINGS 98, 98–123 (Austin Sarat ed., 2012) (defending the Fourteenth
Amendment’s ratification); infra subsection I.B.3.
16 See John Harrison, The Lawfulness of the Reconstruction Amendments, 68 U. CHI. L. REV.
375, 423–57 (2001); infra subsection I.B.4.
17 See ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 14, at 234–38 (characterizing the
election of 1868 as a consolidating event even though the Fifteenth Amendment had not
yet been proposed); id. at 475 n.15 (“There are problems with the Fifteenth Amendment
as well, but an elaborate discussion will not advance my general argument.”); AMAR,
AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 9, at 367 (calculating a true-blue ratification for only
the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments); id. at 601 n.26 (asserting in passing that “all
the Reconstruction Amendments” satisfy “a true-blue-only approach”); Harrison, supra
note 16, at 378 n.12 (“Although this Article is about all three Reconstruction amendments,
it will be necessary to discuss in detail only two, the Thirteenth and the Fourteenth. . . . The
objections to the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments are thus the same . . . .”); see also
Colby, supra note 13, at 1664 n.218 (“Actually, the other Reconstruction Amendments may
also be susceptible to some of the objections raised here, but this Article does not address
them.”); Green, Loyal Denominator, supra note 11, at 49 n.3 (mentioning the Fifteenth
Amendment only once and in reference to the 1872 Democratic Party Platform’s
acquiescence in its ratification).
18 For example, the amendments were passed by rump Congresses. See infra
subsection II.A.1.
19 See Ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment Rescinded, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 1870, at 1, as
reprinted in LASH, VOL. 2, supra note 6, at 585–86.
20 See S.J. Res. 4, 92d Leg. (N.J. 1868) (enacted), as reprinted in LASH, VOL. 2, supra
note 6, at 408–11 (discussing New Jersey’s rescission in February and March 1868);
Legislature Rescinds Prior Ratification, PLAIN DEALER, Jan. 12, 1868, at 1, as reprinted in LASH,
VOL. 2, supra note 6, at 404 (noting Ohio’s rescission in January 1868).
21 See infra notes 120–21 and accompanying text.
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the Fifteenth Amendment. 22 And then there’s Georgia. After being
readmitted to the Union in 1868, Georgia excluded black
officeholders from its state legislature, admitted ex-rebels to the state
legislature, and refused to ratify the Fifteenth Amendment. Congress,
in turn, expelled Georgia and required the ratification of the Fifteenth
Amendment as a new fundamental condition for its second
readmission. 23 Given all of these uncertainties, Secretary of State
Hamilton Fish delayed proclaiming the Fifteenth Amendment’s
ratification for several weeks, waiting until March 30, 1870, to do so. 24
These
irregularities
were
raised—and
rejected—during
Reconstruction. 25
Under any theory—whether loyal, reduced, or full
denominator—at least one of these questions must be resolved:
namely, whether rescissions are valid; whether a Northern rump state
legislature’s ratification is acceptable; and whether a Reconstructed
Southern State can be kicked out of the Union and required to ratify
an amendment for its second readmission. The addition of the
Fifteenth Amendment to this debate poses the most serious problem
for the loyal-denominator theory because both Indiana’s and New
York’s ratifications are necessary. Overall, the Fifteenth Amendment’s
ratification is far trickier than the literature has assumed.
Turning to the contemporary academic theories, the Fifteenth
Amendment
significantly
undermines
Ackerman’s
dualist
interpretation of Reconstruction, as his constitutional moment ends
before Congress even passes the Fifteenth Amendment. By contrast,
Amar’s Guarantee Clause approach and Harrison’s de facto
government account are relatively unscathed by the Fifteenth
Amendment.
Notwithstanding these irregularities, the Fifteenth Amendment is
on solid constitutional ground. Because rescissions are invalid and

22 See 11 BREVIER LEGISLATIVE REPORTS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF
INDIANA, SPECIAL SESSION OF 1869, at 239–44 (1869), as reprinted in LASH VOL. 2, supra note
6, at 573–74.
23 See LASH VOL. 2, supra note 6, at 545.
24 See CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 2289–90 (1870), as reprinted in LASH VOL. 2,
supra note 6, at 595–97 (proclamation); see also The Amendment Complete, BOS. DAILY J., Feb.
4, 1870, at 2, as reprinted in LASH VOL. 2, supra note 6, at 593–94 (arguing that the Fifteenth
Amendment has been ratified); LASH VOL. 2, supra note 6, at 545 (focusing on New York
and Indiana’s problematic ratifications as cause of delay); GILLETTE, supra note 5, at 84–85
tbl.2 (focusing on New York and Georgia’s problematic ratifications as reason for delay).
25 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3480–85 (1870) (statement of Sen.
Vickers (D-MD)) (providing a laundry list of objections); Wood v. Fitzgerald, 3 Or. 568, 578
(1870) (noting dispute over New York’s rescission but stating that “for even if the state of
New York has the power [to rescind its ratification], the necessary number of states ratifying
the [Fifteenth] amendment still remains”).
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because Congress unequivocally counted Indiana’s ratification, the
Fifteenth Amendment satisfied Article V’s three-fourths requirement.
To be clear, no one seriously claims that the Reconstruction
Amendments should be stricken from the Constitution. 26 Rather, this
debate is a foil for broader interpretive conversations about the nature
of constitutional change and popular sovereignty. On this front, the
Fifteenth Amendment represents a crowning achievement: not only
did it enfranchise black men nationwide, but it was also the first
constitutional provision whose adoption is clearly attributable to black
men under the reduced- and full-denominator theories. Furthermore,
the adoption of the Reconstruction Amendments demonstrates that
democracies must sometimes make hard decisions to protect
themselves from secessionist, racist, and antidemocratic forces. The
Reconstruction Framers’ actions foreshadow modern theories for
safeguarding democracy, such as militant democracy, political process
theory, and constitutional hardball.
This Essay is organized as follows. Part I begins by discussing the
history of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments’ ratification
processes and then outlines the theories of the Reconstruction
Framers, Ackerman, Amar, and Harrison as they relate to those
amendments. Part II excavates the unique problems associated with
the Fifteenth Amendment’s adoption. Part III discusses how the
Fifteenth Amendment’s irregular ratification complicates the leading
theories. Part IV defends the Fifteenth Amendment’s validity, both
legally and normatively.
I.

THE LAWFULNESS OF THE THIRTEENTH AND FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENTS

Civil wars are messy affairs—and the constitutional changes that
frequently follow them are as well. Rather than adopt an entirely new

26 The Court has made clear that “[t]he suggestion that the Fifteenth [Amendment]
was incorporated in the Constitution, not in accordance with law, but practically as a war
measure which has been validated by acquiescence, cannot be entertained.” Leser v.
Garnett, 258 U.S. 130, 136 (1922); see also Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 67–
72 (1872) (surveying the recent ratifications of the Reconstruction Amendments and not
questioning their validity). Furthermore, numerous state laws have been invalidated under
the Fifteenth Amendment and, conversely, several federal laws have been upheld as valid
exercises of Congress’s Fifteenth Amendment enforcement authority. See, e.g., Guinn v.
United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915) (invalidating Grandfather Clause); South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966) (upholding the VRA’s original coverage formula and
preclearance regime). Finally, several voting rights amendments have been adopted that
presume the Fifteenth’s validity. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (sex discrimination); id.
amend. XXIV (poll tax); id. amend. XXVI (age discrimination).

2022]

THE LAWFULNESS OF THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT

1551

constitution, 27 the United States kept its founding document but
radically altered it with three constitutional amendments. The
Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery.
The Fourteenth
Amendment endorsed birthright citizenship, constitutionalized the
Civil Rights Act of 1866, created an apportionment penalty for
disenfranchising men, barred former Confederates from holding
office, and repudiated the Confederate war debt. The Fifteenth
Amendment granted black men the right to vote nationwide. All three
amendments empowered Congress to enforce their provisions
through appropriate legislation.
Article V provides that Congress may “propose Amendments”
when “two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary” and those
amendments “shall be valid . . . when ratified by the Legislatures of
three-fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths
thereof.” 28 Article V further provides that “no State, without its
Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.” 29 The
irregularities concerning the Reconstruction Amendments’
ratifications can be traced to the South’s voluntary departure from
Congress from 1861 through its defeat in early 1865 and its subsequent
involuntary exclusion by the Reconstruction Congress seeking to
preserve the spoils of war and advance the civil and political rights of
blacks. Whether and how Congress complied with Article V when it
passed and recognized the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments
has attracted significant scholarly attention.
This Part starts with a brief history of the ratifications of the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments for those unfamiliar with the
tumultuous events of the Civil War and Reconstruction. It then
unpacks the theories of the Radical Republicans, Ackerman, Amar,
and Harrison for why those amendments are constitutionally valid.
A. The Irregular Adoption of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments
In 1860, Abraham Lincoln was elected president without winning
any Southern State. Representing the relatively new Republican Party,
Lincoln advocated against the expansion of slavery into the territories,
but he was not yet an abolitionist. Before Lincoln’s inauguration in
March 1861, seven States in the Lower South purported to secede from
27 Jason Mazzone has argued that the Reconstruction Amendments amount to “a refounding, the result of a second revolution” that “ushered in a new regime, creating a new
Constitution.” Mazzone, supra note 13, at 1808 (footnotes omitted).
28 U.S. CONST. art. V. Article V also provides for a process by which two-thirds of the
state legislatures “shall call a Convention,” id., but that method has never been used. See
Pozen & Schmidt, supra note 13, at 2319 n.2. For a list of open questions concerning Article
V, see id. at 2329–34.
29 U.S. CONST. art. V.
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the Union and declared a Confederate States of America. Following
the Confederacy’s attack on Fort Sumter in April 1861, four Upper
South States joined the rebellion. 30
When the Southern States seceded, most of their Representatives
and Senators left too, thereby substantially increasing the Republicans’
majority in a rump Thirty-Seventh Congress. 31 When the Thirty-Eighth
Congress convened on December 7, 1863, the South was largely absent
once again. 32 Accordingly, during the war’s early years, the South
abandoned its right to representation in Congress.
Throughout the Civil War, Lincoln and the Republican Party
claimed that secession was illegal and that the South had never left. 33
This position, however, created legal and political problems once the
South was defeated and requested representation in Congress. Thus,
the controversy surrounding the Reconstruction Amendments’

30 See AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 9, at 353–55. The Confederate
States were Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. 1 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 818
(11th ed. 1911).
31 See KATE MASUR, UNTIL JUSTICE BE DONE: AMERICA’S FIRST CIVIL RIGHTS
MOVEMENT, FROM THE REVOLUTION TO RECONSTRUCTION 268 (2021). The sole Southern
Senator to stay behind was Andrew Johnson. See Green, Loyal Denominator, supra note 11,
at 69.
Some new members joined the Thirty-Seventh Congress from loyal or reconquered
portions of the South. See Harrison, supra note 16, at 384–85 (discussing Louisiana’s
representatives from the reconquered First and Second congressional districts near New
Orleans); David P. Currie, The Civil War Congress, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 1131, 1218 (2006)
(“The Thirty-seventh Congress had seated representatives from Louisiana and Tennessee
and both senators and representatives from Virginia.”). Most importantly, a loyal
convention of Virginians from the northwestern portion of the state appointed Waitman
Willey and John Carlile as Virginia’s Senators, and they were seated. See id. at 1202, 1210,
1218. Willey introduced the motion that ultimately authorized West Virginia to secede from
Virginia and become its own State in 1863. See id. at 1201–03; Kesavan & Paulsen, supra
note 13, at 297–301.
32 See LASH, VOL. 1, supra note 6, at 373; BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES CONGRESS, 1774–2005, at 166–69 (2005), as reprinted in LASH, VOL. 1, supra note 6,
at 379–84. As in the previous Congress, a loyal “Virginia” government appointed Senators.
See id. at 383. However, Congress rejected other “[c]laimants from Arkansas, Louisiana,
and Virginia.” Currie, supra note 31, at 1218.
33 See Colby, supra note 13, at 1682 (“[T]he North’s entire theory of the war had been
that the South had never legally seceded at all . . . .”); Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 13, at
311 (“Throughout the war, Lincoln remained remarkably consistent on his core
constitutional theory of the unconstitutionality of secession . . . .”); see also Texas v. White,
74 U.S.(7 Wall.) 700, 725 (1869) (“The Constitution . . . looks to an indestructible Union,
composed of indestructible States.”).
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ratification processes is intimately linked to theories of the Union
advanced during the Civil War. 34
1. The Thirteenth Amendment
Following years of debate over abolition and incremental steps
toward that noble goal, 35 the Thirty-Eighth Congress passed the
Thirteenth Amendment. The Senate did so in April 1864, 36 and a
lame-duck House followed suit in January 1865. 37 Given that the South
had not yet surrendered, it was not part of this vote. 38 As such, “the
Thirteenth Amendment . . . won only the support of two-thirds of the
voting members in each house, as distinct from two-thirds of the total
membership, including absent and excluded members.” 39 This
threshold, however, had been deemed sufficient for previous
constitutional amendments. 40 The Thirteenth Amendment was
presented to and signed by President Lincoln, even though his
signature was unnecessary under Article V. 41 A constitutional
amendment was thus sent to the States in the midst of a civil war. 42
34 See KYVIG, supra note 13, at 163 (“Lincoln’s unwavering insistence from the moment
of his inauguration that the Union remain unbroken, that states could not leave and had
not left it, led directly to this problem of the ratification majority.”).
35 See id. at 159 (discussing the Emancipation Proclamation); AMAR, AMERICA’S
CONSTITUTION, supra note 9, at 356 (discussing Congress’s compensated abolition of slavery
in the District of Columbia); Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 13, at 301 (observing that
Congress conditioned West Virginia’s admission to the Union on the abolition of slavery);
MASUR, supra note 31, at 348 (reframing abolitionism as our nation’s “first civil rights
movement”); Crum, Superfluous, supra note 3, at 1581–82 (discussing constitutional twosteps and the Thirteenth Amendment).
36 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong. 1st Sess. 1479–83, 1483–90 (1864), as reprinted in LASH,
VOL. 1, supra note 6, at 434–42.
37 See CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 478–84, 523–31 (1865), as reprinted in LASH,
VOL. 1, supra note 6, at 485–95.
38 The Thirty-Eighth Congress still had a quorum even if the South was included in
the denominator. See Harrison, supra note 16, at 378 n.11; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5
(defining quorum as a majority).
39 AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 9, at 367.
40 See id. (explaining that similar thresholds were satisfactory for the Bill of Rights and
the Twelfth Amendment). Vice President Hannibal Hamlin rejected a challenge to the
Thirteenth Amendment’s passage in the Senate on the grounds that two-thirds of voting
members suffices under Article V. See CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong. 1st Sess. 1479–83, 1487–
90 (1864), as reprinted in LASH, VOL. 1, supra note 6, at 443; see also U.S. CONST. art I, § 5
(providing that “a Majority of each [house] shall constitute a Quorum to do Business”).
41 See LASH, VOL. 1, supra note 6, at 378; see also Harrison, supra note 16, at 389 & n.79
(observing that the Thirteenth Amendment is the sole amendment to be presented to and
signed by a president); Pozen & Schmidt, supra note 13, at 2348 (noting that President
James Buchanan signed the unratified Corwin Amendment, which would have divested
Congress of authority to regulate or abolish slavery within States).
42 See LASH, VOL. 1, supra note 6, at 378.
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Shortly thereafter in February 1865, Congress counted the
electoral votes from the 1864 presidential election. 43 Acting consistent
with its position vis-à-vis the Thirteenth Amendment’s passage,
Congress rejected electors sent by Louisiana and Tennessee on the
grounds that the South was not entitled to vote in the Electoral
College. 44 From a practical standpoint, this action was a non-event, as
Lincoln won the presidency regardless of the South’s exclusion. 45
As Southern States fell under Union control, reconstituted
Southern governments sought to rejoin the Union, but Lincoln
declined to recognize them. 46 Tragically, Lincoln was assassinated
shortly after the Confederacy’s formal surrender at Appomattox.
Lincoln’s death would have profound ramifications for Reconstruction
and put Congress in the driver’s seat. 47
Although
President
Andrew
Johnson’s
handling
of
Reconstruction would prove disastrous and ultimately end in his
impeachment, he continued Lincoln’s policy against recognizing the
Southern governments. Johnson appointed governors who, in turn,
called for loyalist conventions that barred slavery and rejected
secession. 48 Johnson oversaw Reconstruction for seven months given
the late starting date of the Thirty-Ninth Congress. 49 Johnson also
pressured the Southern States to ratify the Thirteenth Amendment. 50
43 Prior to the Twentieth Amendment, Presidential and Congressional terms ended
in March instead of January. See U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 1; BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE
FAILURE OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS: JEFFERSON, MARSHALL, AND THE RISE OF PRESIDENTIAL
DEMOCRACY 116–19 (2005).
44 See Joint Resolution Declaring Certain States Not Entitled to Representation in the
Electoral College, no. 12, 13 Stat. 567, 567–68 (1865); Currie, supra note 31, at 1222–24.
Congress followed this precedent in the 1868 election when it excluded the electoral
votes of Mississippi, Texas, and Virginia, as those States had not yet been readmitted. See
Green, Loyal Denominator, supra note 11, at 83 n.118; see also infra subsection II.B.3. And in
the 1872 election, Congress declined to count the electoral votes from Arkansas and
Louisiana given Klan-related violence and other election irregularities. See EDWARD B.
FOLEY, BALLOT BATTLES: THE HISTORY OF DISPUTED ELECTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 112–
15 (2016).
45 See EDWARD B. FOLEY, PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS AND MAJORITY RULE: THE RISE,
DEMISE, AND POTENTIAL RESTORATION OF THE JEFFERSONIAN ELECTORAL COLLEGE 81
(2020) (“Those 212 electoral votes gave Lincoln a landslide in terms of the electoral votes
actually cast that year: only 234, because the South did not participate. But even if all the
Confederate states were counted against Lincoln, his 212 votes still would have been a
strong Electoral College majority.”).
46 Harrison, supra note 16, at 393–94.
47 See id. at 461.
48 See Colby, supra note 13, at 1642–43.
49 ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 14, at 138.
50 Although not a fundamental condition imposed by Congress, Johnson eventually
made clear that he wanted the Southern States to ratify the Thirteenth Amendment before
their readmission to the Union. See id. at 141–50 (discussing the evolution of Johnson’s
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On December 4, 1865, the Thirty-Ninth Congress opened its first
session. By this point, twenty-five States had ratified the Thirteenth
Amendment: nineteen Northern States and six Southern States. 51
Whether the Thirteenth Amendment had been ratified depended on
the relevant denominator, as there were thirty-six total States in the
Union but only twenty-five loyal States. 52 Indeed, Senator Charles
Sumner (R-MA) introduced a resolution proclaiming that the
Thirteenth Amendment had been ratified based on a loyaldenominator theory, asserting that “it belongs to the two Houses of
Congress to determine when such ratification is complete . . . .”53
Rather than resolve that question, the Thirty-Ninth Congress
confronted whether to seat Representatives and Senators from the
South. It had quickly become apparent that the South’s defeat did not
mean its contrition. In fact, many Southern officials had simply
changed out of their Confederate uniforms. 54 Starting in summer
1865, Southern States and localities enacted the notorious Black
Codes, which were designed to establish a de facto system of slavery
using strict vagrancy and labor laws. 55 Recognizing that the Union’s
victory on the battlefield was at risk, the Thirty-Ninth Congress
excluded the South. 56 On this point, Congress relied on its Article I
authority to “Judge . . . the . . . Qualifications of its own Members,”57
and, in any event, the Thirty-Ninth Congress had a quorum in both
houses notwithstanding the South’s exclusion. 58
pressure on the Southern States to ratify); LAURA F. EDWARDS, A LEGAL HISTORY OF THE
CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION: A NATION OF RIGHTS 88 (2015) (“President Johnson
made explicit assurances to the representatives of former Confederate states to obtain the
required votes.”); ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION,
1863–1877, at 276 (1988) (“A precedent existed for requiring a state to ratify an
amendment to gain representation in Congress, for Johnson had done precisely the same
thing with regard to the Thirteenth.”).
51 See AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 9, at 366.
52 See id.
53 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1865); see also ACKERMAN,
TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 14, at 150–51 (providing context for Sumner’s argument).
54 See FONER, supra note 50, at 196–98 (observing that the South sent several former
Confederates, including Vice President Alexander H. Stephens, to Congress).
55 See id. at 198–201.
56 See Harrison, supra note 16, at 399, 402.
57 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5; see also Harrison, supra note 16, at 453 (discussing this
provision’s relevance to Reconstruction).
58 See Harrison, supra note 16, at 398 n.122; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5 (providing
that “a Majority of each [house] shall constitute a Quorum to do Business”).
On the horizon loomed an even larger threat: once the Thirteenth Amendment was
ratified, the Constitution’s infamous Three-Fifths Clause was effectively null and void. The
perverse consequence was that the political power of Southern whites would increase after
the 1870 census, as freedpersons would count as full persons for purposes of apportionment
even though they could not vote. See Crum, Superfluous, supra note 3, at 1587–88. At the
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In the ensuing days, Georgia, North Carolina, and Oregon ratified
the Thirteenth Amendment. 59 The two Southern States did so
potentially in response to Congress’s exclusion of Southern
representatives. 60 These ratifications put the Thirteenth Amendment
over the top.
On December 18, 1865, Secretary of State William Seward
declared that the Thirteenth Amendment had been ratified. In his
proclamation, Seward specifically stated that “the whole number of
states of the United States is thirty-six.”61 Seward identified “twentyseven states” as ratifying the Thirteenth Amendment. 62 Seward’s list,
therefore, included the Southern States as part of the Article V
numerator and denominator, expressly rejecting the Radicals’ loyaldenominator theory. 63 Notwithstanding an attempt by Radical
Congressman Thaddeus Stevens (R-PA) to endorse Sumner’s loyaldenominator theory in the House, Congress acquiesced to Seward’s
count. 64
2. The Fourteenth Amendment
The Thirty-Ninth Congress was one of the most powerful and
accomplished Congresses in our nation’s history. Following the
Thirteenth Amendment’s ratification, Congress invoked its new
enforcement authority to pass the Civil Rights Act of 1866. 65 Designed

time, it was estimated that the South would gain an additional fifteen seats in the House.
See id. at 1588 & n.247. Although mid-decade redistricting was common at this time, see
Michael S. Kang, Hyperpartisan Gerrymandering, 61 B.C. L. REV. 1379, 1392 (2020),
congressional apportionment occurs only after each decennial census, see Pamela S. Karlan,
Reapportionment, Nonapportionment, and Recovering Some Lost History of One Person, One Vote,
59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1921, 1923 n.6 (2018). As such, the earliest that the South would
have been entitled to more seats in Congress was after the 1872 election. See EDWARDS,
supra note 50, at 104.
59 See AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 9, at 366–67.
60 See id. at 366 (noting this possibility but discounting it).
61 13 Stat. 774 (1865), as reprinted in LASH, Vol. 1, supra note 6, at 561.
62 Id. These States are Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana,
Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Id. I have
reordered Seward’s list to be alphabetical for ease of reading. California ratified the day
after Seward’s proclamation. See AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 9, at 366–67
(noting that California ratified on December 19).
63 See ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 14, at 153 (describing Seward’s
proclamation as “a remarkably provocative act” that “forthrightly reject[ed] the view of
ratification as an exclusively Northern affair”).
64 See id. at 155–57.
65 See Crum, Superfluous, supra note 3, at 1582.
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to eliminate the Black Codes, 66 the Civil Rights Act stayed true to its
name and protected civil—but not political—rights. 67 The Act’s
constitutionality, however, was hotly contested, including by leading
Republicans like Representative John Bingham. 68 Congress, therefore,
proceeded to pass the Fourteenth Amendment to “provide an
incontrovertible constitutional foundation for the act.” 69
In June 1866, Congress approved the Fourteenth Amendment. 70
As relevant here, the Fourteenth Amendment received the requisite
two-thirds vote of present members, but “only because the elected
congressional contingents from the Southern states had not been
permitted to vote.” 71 It was also a partisan affair: no Democrat in either
house of Congress voted for the Fourteenth Amendment. 72 The battle
then shifted to the States.
The Southern States, with the exception of Tennessee, rejected it
by wide margins. 73 The South’s recalcitrance is unsurprising given that
the Southern electorate remained entirely white. 74 For its part, the
Tennessee state legislature obtained a quorum “only through the use
of force against opposition legislators.”75 As a reward, Tennessee was
swiftly readmitted to the Union in July 1866. 76

66 See FONER, supra note 50, at 244.
67 The protected rights included “the rights to make and enforce contracts; to buy,
lease, inherit, hold and convey property; to sue and be sued and to give evidence in court;
to legal protections for the security of person and property; and to equal treatment under
the criminal law.” Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA.
L. REV. 947, 1027 (1995); see also id. at 1016 (explaining that the Reconstruction Framers
believed in a “tripartite division of rights . . . between civil rights, political rights, and social
rights”).
68 See GERARD N. MAGLIOCCA, AMERICAN FOUNDING SON: JOHN BINGHAM AND THE
INVENTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 120 (2013); see also Currie, supra note 13, at
396 (sharing Bingham’s concerns).
69 AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 9, at 362.
70 See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3026, 3031–42 (1866), as reprinted in LASH,
Vol. 2, supra note 6, at 211 (Senate); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3148–49 (1866),
as reprinted in LASH, Vol. 2, supra note 6, at 220 (House).
71 Colby, supra note 13, at 1643.
72 Crum, Reconstructing, supra note 5, at 301.
73 Id. at 300.
74 Id.
75 Colby, supra note 13, at 1644; see also id. at 1644 n.89 (noting that opposition
legislators were “tracked down, arrested, and dragged to the legislative chamber”).
Tennessee’s Speaker of the House responded by “refus[ing] to sign a certificate of
ratification . . . but Congress simply ignored his objections.” Id. This spectacle “raise[d]
legitimate doubts about whether [Tennessee’s] people were really in favor” of ratification.
Id. at 1644.
76 Harrison, supra note 16, at 404 (noting that Tennessee ratified within a month and
Congress “[e]ven more promptly” readmitted it to the Union). The Joint Resolution
readmitting Tennessee mentioned, inter alia, that the State had ratified the Thirteenth and
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While the Fourteenth Amendment was met with near-uniform
Southern resistance, it fared far better in the North. Connecticut, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, Oregon, and Vermont quickly ratified. 77 Then
came the November 1866 elections. Running on a platform to ratify
the Fourteenth Amendment, the Republicans won in a landslide. 78
Shortly thereafter, fourteen Northern States ratified by “consistently
wide margins.” 79 Only the Border States with recent histories of slavery
rejected the amendment. 80
When the Thirty-Ninth Congress convened for its lame-duck
session in early 1867, the Republicans’ resounding victory in the 1866
election had “strengthened . . . the radical wing of the party.”81 For a
mix of altruistic and partisan reasons, Congress moved to enfranchise
black men living in areas under federal control. 82 Congress started by
banning racial discrimination in voting in the District of Columbia and
the federal territories. 83
In addition, Congress required Nebraska to adopt black male
suffrage as a so-called fundamental condition for statehood. 84
Although fundamental conditions had been used in the past, 85 this was
the first time ever that Congress would tie the right to vote to
admission. 86 The legality of these fundamental conditions was
contested, and there were serious doubts in the Republican caucus

Fourteenth Amendments. See Joint Resolution Restoring Tennessee to her Relations to the
Union, no. 73, 14 Stat. 364 (1866).
77 KYVIG, supra at 13, at 170–72.
78 See ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 14, at 178–82.
79 KYVIG, supra note 13, at 172. Massachusetts would ratify in March 1867, after the
First Reconstruction Act’s passage. Id.
80 Id. (discussing Delaware, Kentucky, and Maryland). Maryland’s rejection occurred
after the passage of the First Reconstruction Act. See id. at 172–73.
81 MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 5, at 123.
82 See Crum, Superfluous, supra note 3, at 1597–1602 (discussing Republicans’ motives
for enfranchising black men).
83 See An Act to Regulate the Elective Franchise in the District of Columbia, ch. 6, 14
Stat. 375 (1867); An Act to Regulate the Elective Franchise in the Territories of the United
States, ch. 15, 14 Stat. 379 (1867).
84 An Act for the Admission of the State of Nebraska into the Union, ch. 36, § 3, 14
Stat. 391, 392 (1867).
85 See GREGORY ABLAVSKY, FEDERAL GROUND: GOVERNING PROPERTY AND VIOLENCE IN
THE FIRST U.S. TERRITORIES 226–27 (2021) (conditioning Ohio’s admission in 1802 on its
relinquishment of claims to federal land within its borders); Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note
13, at 301 (conditioning West Virginia’s admission on the abolition of slavery).
86 See MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 5, at 127.
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about their long-term viability. 87 Furthermore, Congress did not
mandate that Nebraska ratify the Fourteenth Amendment. 88
Most importantly, Congress passed the First Reconstruction Act,
which applied to the Southern States except Tennessee. 89 The Act
imposed military rule and declared the existing governments to be null
and void—the very Southern governments that had ratified the
Thirteenth Amendment. 90
To ensure the loyalty of the next governments, the First
Reconstruction Act reshaped the Southern body politic. Congress
mandated black male suffrage, 91 predicting that black voters would
defend their own interests and overwhelmingly support the
Republican Party. 92
Congress also disenfranchised former
Confederates. 93
Congress, moreover, directed that new state
constitutions have universal male suffrage. 94
The First Reconstruction Act inaugurated “a stunning and
unprecedented experiment in interracial democracy.” 95 At the time,

87 See id. (explaining that Republican Senator Jacob Howard was “one of the most
persistent critics of the idea that Congress could set suffrage-related conditions for
admission to statehood that would bind erstwhile territories after the admission process was
completed”); Thomas B. Colby, In Defense of the Equal Sovereignty Principle, 65 DUKE L.J. 1087,
1162–64 (2016) (discussing these doubts and their role in the passage of the Fifteenth
Amendment).
88 See An Act for the Admission of the State of Nebraska into the Union, ch. 36, 14
Stat. 391 (1867).
89 See An Act to Provide for the More Efficient Government of the Rebel States, ch.
153, Preamble, 14 Stat. 428, 428 (1867). By this point, Tennessee had been readmitted to
the Union and had already ratified the Fourteenth Amendment and enfranchised black
men. See Crum, Superfluous, supra note 3, at 1595 n.300; supra notes 73–76 and
accompanying text.
90 See Harrison, supra note 16, at 405 (describing the First Reconstruction Act);
ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 14, at 113 (asking “why Seward was right to
count these white governments when they said Yes on the Thirteenth Amendment but why
Congress could destroy these governments in 1867 when they said No” to the Fourteenth
Amendment).
91 An Act to Provide for the More Efficient Government of the Rebel States, ch. 153,
§ 5, 14 Stat. 428, 429 (1867).
92 See Amar & Brownstein, supra note 5, at 939; Crum, Reconstructing, supra note 5, at
300–01.
93 See An Act to Provide for the More Efficient Government of the Rebel States, ch.
153, § 5, 14 Stat. 428, 429 (1867) (permitting “disfranchise[ment] for participation in the
rebellion”); 1 HANES WALTON, JR., SHERMAN C. PUCKETT & DONALD R. DESKINS, JR., THE
AFRICAN AMERICAN ELECTORATE: A STATISTICAL HISTORY 244 tbl.13.7 (2012) (showing that
over 47,000 ex-Confederates were disenfranchised in Florida, Georgia, North Carolina,
South Carolina, and Virginia).
94 See FONER, supra note 50, at 276.
95 Id. at 278.
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the overwhelming majority of black Americans lived in the South. 96
Moreover, “Black voters . . . constituted effective voting majorities in
five Southern States—Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and
South Carolina—given their high registration rates and the
disenfranchisement of ex-Confederates pursuant to the First
Reconstruction Act.”97 Robust black turnout ranging from 70% to 90%
also helped reshape Southern politics. 98
Finally, the First Reconstruction Act imposed the fundamental
condition that the Southern States ratify the Fourteenth Amendment
prior to their readmission to the Union. 99 Indeed, the Act delayed
readmission until the Fourteenth Amendment “shall have become a
part of the Constitution . . . .” 100
Meanwhile, with nineteen Northern States having ratified by the
end of February 1867, the question arose whether the Fourteenth
Amendment had already become part of the Constitution. 101 After all,
nineteen loyal States divided by twenty-five loyal States satisfies the
three-fourths threshold. The House repeatedly requested updates
from Seward in early 1867, but Seward’s figures were artificially low
because the official paperwork from several States had not yet
arrived. 102 Congress, however, did not declare that the Fourteenth
Amendment had been ratified based on a loyal-denominator theory. 103
By spring 1868, “[w]ith every non-Confederate state except
Democratically controlled California . . . having acted, the outcome
depended upon the South.” 104 Given the newly empowered black
electorate, the Southern State legislatures had changed dramatically.

96 See Crum, Reconstructing, supra note 5, at 302 (showing that the First Reconstruction
Act and the enfranchisement of black men in the federal territories and the District of
Columbia expanded the right to vote to approximately 80% of black men).
97 Id. at 302–03.
98 See id. at 303–04.
99 See An Act to Provide for the More Efficient Government of the Rebel States, ch.
153, § 5, 14 Stat. 428, 429 (1867). Recall that Johnson also put pressure on Southern States
to ratify the Thirteenth Amendment. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
100 An Act to Provide for the More Efficient Government of the Rebel States, ch. 153,
§ 5, 14 Stat. 428, 429 (1867). In 1868, Congress would impose the fundamental condition
that the Southern States not backslide by disenfranchising black men. See MALTZ, CIVIL
RIGHTS, supra note 5, at 140.
101 For a helpful table with ratifying dates, see Green, Loyal Denominator, supra note 11,
at 55.
102 See id. at 91–92.
103 See id. at 92.
104 KYVIG, supra note 13, at 173.
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Over the next few weeks, six Southern States ratified the Fourteenth
Amendment. 105
Around the same time, trouble was brewing in the North. In
January 1868, Ohio purported to rescind its ratification. 106 The next
month, New Jersey passed a law rescinding its ratification, but the
governor vetoed that law on the grounds that rescission was unlawful.
New Jersey’s state legislature responded by overruling the veto. 107
Thus, the issue of rescission arose for the first time in the
Reconstruction Amendments’ ratification saga.
On July 20, 1868, Seward issued his first proclamation recognizing
the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification. Seward’s list proceeded in
a piecemeal fashion. He began by identifying the twenty-two Northern
States plus Tennessee that had ratified the Amendment. 108 Seward
then separately listed the six Reconstructed Southern States. 109 Next,
Seward flagged that Ohio and New Jersey had purported to rescind
their ratifications and that it was “a matter of doubt and uncertainty
whether such resolutions are not irregular, invalid, and therefore
ineffectual for withdrawing . . . consent.” 110 Once again, Seward
rejected a reduced-denominator theory, stating that “the whole
number of States in the United States is thirty-seven.” 111 He concluded
by stating that “twenty-three States,” including New Jersey and Ohio,
and “six [Reconstructed Southern] States” had ratified the
Amendment. 112

105 See id. at 174 (noting the ratifications of Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Louisiana,
North Carolina, and South Carolina). Georgia ratified on July 21, the day after Seward’s
first proclamation. See id.
106 See id.
107 See id.
108 Seward listed Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York,
Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, West Virginia, and
Wisconsin. 15 Stat. 706 (1868), as reprinted in LASH, Vol. 2, supra note 6, at 422.
109 These States were Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Louisiana, North Carolina, and
South Carolina. Id.
110 Id.
111 Id. Nebraska was admitted to the Union in 1867, thus increasing by one the total
number of States from the time the Thirteenth Amendment was ratified. See An Act for the
Admission of the State of Nebraska into the Union, ch. 36, 14 Stat. 391 (1867).
112 15 Stat. 706 (1868), as reprinted in LASH, Vol. 2, supra note 6, at 422. Seward also
listed States that had first rejected the Fourteenth Amendment before later ratifying it. See
KYVIG, supra note 13, at 174 (noting that Louisiana, North Carolina, and South Carolina
had done this). Seward gave no indication that a prior rejection was problematic for
ratification.
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The very next day, both houses of Congress adopted resolutions
declaring the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification. 113 Congress’s list
included New Jersey and Ohio, omitting any concerns about their
purported rescissions. 114 Congress’s list also included Tennessee and
the Reconstructed Southern States that had ratified the Fourteenth
Amendment. 115 In contrast to Seward, Congress did not expressly list
the “whole number” of States. 116
Then, on July 28, 1868, Seward issued a second proclamation
recognizing the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification. 117 Seward’s list
now included Georgia given its recent ratification. 118 His tone had also
shifted considerably. Seward mentioned the New Jersey and Ohio
rescissions, but he did so matter of factly and without commentary. 119
Moreover, Seward was silent on the whole number of States necessary
for ratification.
Here, it is important to clarify how the New Jersey and Ohio
rescissions are treated under the various theories. Under a fulldenominator theory, these rescissions were mooted by Alabama’s and
Georgia’s ratifications in mid-July 1868. 120 By contrast, under the loyalor reduced-denominator theories, these rescissions were tardy because
the necessary nineteen Northern States had ratified by mid-February
1867. 121
In sum, the rump Thirty-Ninth Congress counted the Southern
States for purposes of ratifying the Thirteenth Amendment while
excluding those States from representation when it passed the
Fourteenth Amendment. It also declared void the state legislatures
that had ratified the Thirteenth Amendment and completely
reorganized those governments by enfranchising black men and
requiring the approval of new constitutions. It further imposed various
forms of pressure—military rule, fundamental conditions, and
continued exclusion from Congress—as it sought to ensure the
Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification. For its part, the Fortieth
Congress pushed back on Seward’s initial proclamation and adopted
resolutions that included both the rescinding States and the
Reconstructed South.

113 See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 4266 & 4295 (1868), as reprinted in LASH,
Vol. 2, supra note 6, at 422–24.
114 See id.
115 See id.
116 Cf. supra note 111 and accompanying text.
117 15 Stat. 708 (1868), 708–11, as reprinted in LASH, Vol. 2, supra note 6, at 425–27.
118 See id.
119 See id. at 426.
120 See AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 9, at 601 n.19.
121 See id. at 367; see also id. at 601 n.22 (arguing that the rescissions “came too late”).
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B. The Great Debate
The story just told “bears virtually no resemblance to the idealized
process of lawmaking by national supermajoritarian consensus”
envisioned by Article V. 122 Throughout Reconstruction, leading
Radicals acknowledged these ratification irregularities and developed
legal theories to justify their actions and defend the new amendments’
validities. In the modern era, Ackerman fired the first shot by
excavating this debate and problematizing the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments’ ratifications in service of his dualist theory
of constitutional change. 123 Amar and Harrison took up the charge
and responded to Ackerman with their own theories for the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments’ compliance with Article
V. 124
In this Section, I begin with the Radicals’ theory and its modern
advocates.
I then address Ackerman’s dualist theory, Amar’s
Guarantee Clause theory, and Harrison’s de facto government theory.
1. Loyal- and Reduced-Denominator Theories
Recall that during the Civil War, Lincoln repeatedly asserted that
secession was illegal and void. 125 But as the war dragged on and the
problem of obtaining Southern assent to constitutional amendments
loomed on the horizon, several leading Radicals endorsed new
theories that authorized Congressional action in the South. 126 Stevens
advocated a “conquered provinces” theory, which claimed that the
Southern States had indeed left the Union and had been defeated by
the North in war. 127 Accordingly, the Southern States had ceased to
exist “as political entities.” 128 In a similar vein, Sumner argued that the

122 Colby, supra note 13, at 1655; but see Pozen & Schmidt, supra note 13, at 2339 (“Ever
since the Founding, amendments of uncertain legal validity have been the norm in the
United States, not the exception.”). For his part, Colby “take[s] no position” on whether
“the Fourteenth Amendment formally complied with the terms of Article V . . . .” Colby,
supra note 13, at 1675.
123 See Green, Loyal Denominator, supra note 11, at 48–49 (crediting Ackerman with
sparking this modern debate).
124 See id.
125 See supra notes 33–34 and accompanying text.
126 The high bar set by Article V was a foreseeable problem in the Reconstruction
Congress and “one of the antislavery amendments offered at the start of the Thirty-eighth
Congress proposed the lowering of Article V supermajority requirements.” KYVIG, supra
note 13, at 163; see also Jason Mazzone, Amending the Amendment Procedures of Article V, 13
DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 115, 121 (2018) (putting forth a proposal that would ask
voters whether to call a convention on constitutional amendments every twenty years).
127 See Harrison, supra note 16, at 390 & n.83.
128 Id. at 390 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 251–53 (1867)).
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Southern States had committed “suicide” and had reverted to
territorial status. 129 The upshot was that Congress could regulate the
States pursuant to Article IV. 130 Representative Samuel Shellabarger
(R-OH) disputed that the South had actually seceded but
acknowledged that attempted secession had abrogated the southern
governments’ political relations with the United States. 131
These theories were also deployed in debates over the ratification
process, and numerous Radical Republicans endorsed loyal- and
reduced-denominator approaches. 132 Under this view, the States that
left the Union simply did not matter for purposes of Article V. The
ratifications of the Southern States were therefore excluded from the
Article V numerator and denominator. 133
However, the reduced-denominator theory “was never the official
policy of the Reconstruction Congress.”134 Congress failed to expressly
repudiate Seward’s inclusion of the Southern States in the Thirteenth
Amendments’ ratification proclamation. 135 And when Congress
rebuffed Seward’s first proclamation of the Fourteenth Amendment,
its list included the Southern States. 136 At the end of the day,
Republicans recognized that using a full denominator would help
bolster public perception about and avoid legal challenges to the
legitimacy of the amendments. 137
Modern scholars have revived this Radical theory. In addition to
his theory premised on the Guarantee Clause, 138 Amar argues for a
“true-blue” approach—i.e., a loyal-denominator theory—that includes
only those States that stayed loyal to the Union and thereby excludes
the eleven States that joined the Confederacy. 139 Christopher Green
129 Id. at 391 & n.84.
130 See id. at 390–91; Green, Loyal Denominator, supra note 11, at 71–72.
131 See Harrison, supra note 16, at 391–92.
132 For a lengthy list of sources, see Green, Loyal Denominator, supra note 11, at 99–146.
133 See Harrison, supra note 16, at 410.
134 AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 9, at 368.
135 See supra notes 61–64 and accompanying text.
136 See supra notes 108–21 and accompanying text.
137 See Harrison, supra note 16, at 414 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 2860
(1868)) (observing that by 1868 “some [Republicans in Congress] said that it would be wise
to have three-fourths of all the states to quell all doubts”).
138 See infra subsection I.B.3.
139 See AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 9, at 366–68. Amar uses the term
“true-blue” as an allusion to the color of Union soldiers’ uniforms.
Green claims that “Amar briefly flirted with this view” but ultimately rejected it. Green,
Loyal Denominator, supra note 11, at 50 n.11; see also id. at 63 (characterizing Amar’s
argument as premised on Article IV’s Guarantee Clause). I interpret Amar’s more recent
writings as consistent with his original two-part argument. Namely, that Congress could have
adopted a true-blue approach but instead pursued a Guarantee Clause strategy. Compare
AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 9, at 367 (“[T]he Thirteenth Amendment
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has also put forward lengthy defenses of the reduced-denominator
theory. 140 According to Green, only States that are in Congress under
Article I should count for ratification purposes under Article V. 141 In
his view, there should be “parity between Articles I and V.” 142
One consequence of the loyal- and reduced-denominator theories
is that the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments’ ratification dates
move up substantially. Instead of being ratified in December 1865, the
Thirteenth becomes part of the Constitution in June 1865. 143 The
Fourteenth’s adoption is even more rapid, as the requisite number of
ratifications was achieved in mid-February 1867. 144
The earlier ratification date matters because the Fourteenth
Amendment would be considered part of the Constitution when
Congress passed the First Reconstruction Act in March 1867. 145 Thus,
concerns about illegal coercion and the use of fundamental conditions
become a distraction, as the Southern States’ ratifications were
unnecessary. 146
Furthermore, New Jersey’s and Ohio’s rescissions in early 1868
“came too late.” 147 As such, loyal- and reduced-denominator theorists
need not take a clear stance on the validity of rescission. Nevertheless,

would also be valid if we instead treated all eleven state governments . . . as having lapsed,
and thus not properly included in either numerator or denominator. . . . As for the
Fourteenth Amendment, the necessary nineteen true-blue states said yes as of mid-February
1867.”), and id. at 368 (“Although several leading Republicans . . . endorsed a true-blueonly approach to Article V, this approach was never the official policy of the Reconstruction
Congress.”), with AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE
PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 87 (2012) [hereinafter AMAR, UNWRITTEN
CONSTITUTION] (“Although the Reconstruction Congress ultimately opted to include exConfederate states in the amendment process, Congress need not have done so.” (emphasis
added)), id. (“Congress improvised a two-stage strategy that relied heavily on the verdict of
true-blue states in the first stage of enactment, but then gave ex-gray states an important
role during the final stage of enactment.”), and Amar, Worth & Geltzer, supra note 15, at
118 (reiterating this two-part argument).
140 See generally Green, Loyal Denominator, supra note 11; Green, Normative Defenses,
supra note 13.
141 See Green, Loyal Denominator, supra note 11, at 50–51.
142 Id. at 61.
143 Id. at 51.
144 See id. at 55; AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 9, at 367.
145 See Green, Loyal Denominator, supra note 11, at 92 (“The Congress passing the
Reconstruction Act knew that the loyal-denominator threshold had been passed; waiting
for the paperwork could, however, justify the language of the statute.”); supra notes 101–20
and accompanying text.
146 See AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 9, at 608 n.57 (“Congress formally
required ex-gray states to ratify only after the Fourteenth Amendment had won ratification
in more than three-fourths of the true-blue states.”).
147 Id. at 601 n.22.
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Amar has argued that States should be permitted to rescind
ratifications. 148 By contrast, Green appears agnostic on this question. 149
These theories, however, become increasingly complicated once
Southern States are readmitted to the Union. Amar’s true-blue count
for the Fourteenth Amendment initially excludes Tennessee. 150 But in
the endnotes, Amar hedges by including Tennessee in his true-blue
accounting, on the grounds that Tennessee was readmitted to the
Union without being subjected to the First Reconstruction Act. 151
Green clearly includes Tennessee in his count. 152 In some ways, this is
an odd view of parity between Articles I and V. On the one hand,
Tennessee was excluded from Congress when it passed the Fourteenth
Amendment. But on the other hand, Tennessee was swiftly readmitted
to the Union as a reward for its ratification and not included in the
First Reconstruction Act. 153 Although not a reduced-denominator
advocate, Harrison notes that including Tennessee in the numerator
is problematic given its potentially coerced ratification. 154
This raises the question: what about the readmitted
Reconstructed States’ ratifications of the Fifteenth Amendment? Are
the Reconstructed Southern States—namely, Alabama, Arkansas,
Florida, Louisiana, North Carolina, and South Carolina—re-added to
the count for the Fifteenth just like Tennessee was for the
Fourteenth? 155 Or should they continue to be excluded based on their
lack of initial loyalty or because their rehabilitation was at gunpoint?
By omitting any discussion of the Fifteenth Amendment, Amar and
Green sidestep the hard question of how to count States following their
readmission to the Union. 156
Given this wrinkle, it is important to distinguish between loyaldenominator and reduced-denominator theories.
A loyal148 See id. at 456 (arguing in favor of a “last-in-time” idea because any other rule would
“feature a perverse ratchet”); id. at 601 n.19 (noting that there are “good reasons for
permitting rescission until the three-quarters bar is cleared” and that “Ohio and New Jersey
should not have been counted as yes votes” for the Fourteenth Amendment).
149 See Green, Loyal Denominator, supra note 11, at 55 n.20.
150 See AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 9, at 367 (stating that the necessary
nineteen Loyal States had ratified the Fourteenth Amendment).
151 See id. at 601 n.22 (including Tennessee in the count); id. at 603 n.35 (describing
Tennessee’s readmission).
152 See Green, Loyal Denominator, supra note 11 at 55.
153 See id. at 60–61.
154 See Harrison, supra note 16, at 412. This pushes the Fourteenth Amendment’s
ratification back to June 1867, several months after the passage of the First Reconstruction
Act. See id.
155 See MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 5, at 140 (discussing these States’
readmissions).
156 Obviously, there is an outer limit here, both temporally and subject-matter-wise.
The post-Reconstruction amendments are not subject to a reduced-denominator theory.
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denominator theory would be akin to Amar’s true-blue approach and
include only those States that did not secede from the Union. To be
explicit: I would exclude Tennessee from the loyal-denominator
theory because it seceded from the Union. A reduced-denominator
theory would include Southern States that have been readmitted to the
Union. 157
2. Ackerman’s Dualist Theory
Ackerman developed the idea of “constitutional moments” 158 to
describe situations when the “People” engage in “higher lawmaking”
that amends the constitution outside of Article V’s strictures. 159 To
separate out normal politics from higher lawmaking, Ackerman asks
whether a “five-stage process” occurred. 160 Specifically, Ackerman
looks for a signaling event, the proposal of a transformative agenda, a
period of intense deliberation, an acquiescence by dissenting
institutions, and a consolidating event. 161 As part of his dualist theory,
Ackerman has identified the New Deal and the civil rights movement
as two examples of this process. 162
Even though the actual text of the Constitution was changed,
Ackerman argues that Reconstruction is an example of higher
lawmaking outside of Article V’s strictures. Ackerman focuses on the
irregular ratifications of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments. 163 In light of the history recounted above, Ackerman
bluntly states that “it [is] very hard to vindicate both” “the ratification
of the Thirteenth [and] the proposal of the Fourteenth.” 164 After all,
the Thirty-Ninth Congress counted the Southern States as part of the
Union when it recognized the Thirteenth Amendment’s ratification
but then excluded those States when it passed the Fourteenth
Amendment and later declared those governments to be illegal in the
157 The loyal denominator would be set at either twenty-five or twenty-six, depending
on whether Nebraska is part of the Union at the relevant time. By contrast, the reduced
denominator would shift depending on how many Southern States have been readmitted.
158 Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013,
1022 (1984).
159 See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 6–7 (1991) [hereinafter
ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS].
160 ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 14, at 20.
161 See id. (outlining this five-step process); id. at 126–27 (framing Lincoln’s election as
a signaling event); ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 159, at 290–91 (outlining a similar
four-part test).
162 See ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 14, at 279–311 (New Deal); 3 BRUCE
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 3 (2014) (civil rights
movement).
163 See ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 14, at 100–252.
164 Id. at 103.
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First Reconstruction Act. Ackerman also characterizes the use of
fundamental conditions as “flat-out inconsistent with the limited
Congressional role described by Article Five.” 165 Most relevant here,
Ackerman identifies the election of 1868 as a consolidation of the
Radical Republican agenda, 166 even though the Fifteenth Amendment
had yet to be proposed in Congress. Ackerman describes the end of
Reconstruction as the “Return of Normal Politics.” 167
In sum, Ackerman finds the problems associated with the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to support his argument for
dualist constitutional change. 168
3. Amar’s Guarantee Clause Theory
Although Amar has endorsed a true-blue theory, 169 he has a
backup, full-denominator plan that is equally—if not more—
prominent. According to Amar, the Southern States remained within
the “geographic contours of the Union” but had “lapse[d] into an
unrepublican condition.” 170 Analogizing to Sumner’s theory, Amar
argues that “the postwar Congress could treat the South much as the
prewar Congress had treated the West[ern]” territories. 171 With the
Southern States no longer truly “States,” Congress could invoke Article
IV’s Guarantee Clause to transform the South. 172
In Amar’s view, the Southern States were unrepublican not only
because of secession but also because they disenfranchised black
men. 173 To be sure, only a handful of Northern States enfranchised
black men at the start of Reconstruction. Anticipating this response,
Amar distinguishes the South on the grounds that the North was
overwhelmingly white whereas several Southern States had

165 Id. at 111.
166 See id. at 20–21 (“After the consolidating election of 1868, there was no longer a
serious question whether the Civil War amendments were legal . . . .”); id. at 211 (“[T]he
election of 1868 served a different constitutional function: consolidation.”); id. at 234
(referring to the election of 1868 as the consolidation of the Reconstruction constitutional
moment).
167 Id. at 247. Seeking to undermine Ackerman’s dualist theory, Michael McConnell
famously applied Ackerman’s approach to Jim Crow, arguing that it constituted a period of
higher lawmaking. See Michael W. McConnell, The Forgotten Constitutional Moment, 11
CONST. COMMENT. 115, 115–16 (1994).
168 See ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 14, at 14 (commenting that “[b]y
breaking the law we will find higher law”).
169 See supra subsection I.B.1.
170 AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 9, at 379.
171 Id.
172 See id. at 370–71.
173 See id. at 368.
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majorities—or near majorities—of black people. 174 Moreover, Amar
reads the Guarantee Clause to contain an “unwritten nonretrogression
principle”
that
barred
“the
unprecedented
disenfranchisement of a vast number of free men.” 175 With these
moves, Amar narrows the Guarantee Clause’s reach to capture only the
South.
From a doctrinal perspective, Amar relies on Luther v. Borden, 176
where the Supreme Court held that the Guarantee Clause raises
nonjusticiable political questions. 177 Luther stemmed from Dorr’s
Rebellion in 1840s Rhode Island. 178 In resolving a dispute over which
of two governments was legitimate, the Court said it was up to Congress
to decide and its “decision is binding on every other department of the
government.”179 Applied to Reconstruction, Amar’s argument goes,
this meant that Congress’s decision to exclude the South was both
unreviewable and controlling for Article V. 180
4. Harrison’s De Facto Government Theory
Similar to this Essay, Harrison canvasses the various theories
concerning the ratification of the Reconstruction Amendments.
Harrison finds the reduced-denominator theory “plausible but

174 See id. at 374. Specifically, the North was under 2% black. Id. But this overall figure
obscures differences in racial demography. The Border States had substantially higher
black populations: Maryland (22.5%); Delaware (18.2%); Kentucky (16.8%); and Missouri
(6.9%). See GILLETTE, supra note 5, at 82 tbl.1. This requires some difficult line-drawing,
as some Southern States had black populations of just “more than a quarter.” AMAR,
AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 9, at 374.
Amar also acknowledges that women were disenfranchised nationwide at the time.
See id. at 376. Amar maintains that sex-based discrimination in voting did not violate the
Guarantee Clause because “men . . . could in turn be relied on to virtually represent the
interests of the women in their lives” whereas “Southern whites could not be trusted to
represent the interests of those whom they had so recently and ruthlessly enslaved.” Id.
175 Amar, Worth & Geltzer, supra note 15, at 117.
176 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
177 See id. at 42; AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 9, at 369–70 (discussing
Luther).
178 Luther, 48 U.S. at 11.
179 Id. at 42.
180 Under a full-denominator theory, the problem of New Jersey’s and Ohio’s
rescissions arises again. Recall that those States rescinded in early 1868, but Seward did not
proclaim that amendment’s ratification until July 1868. Amar, therefore, claims that the
issue was “moot by July 28 . . . when Seward issued his final proclamation” due to Alabama’s
and Georgia’s ratifications. AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 9, at 601 n.19.
Amar focuses on Seward’s second proclamation—not his first. Recall that Georgia ratified
after the first proclamation. See supra note 105 and accompanying text. We thus have
mootness stacked upon mootness: Seward’s second proclamation mooted any problem with
the first proclamation.
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unpersuasive,”181 explaining that the Radicals’ positions “depended on
the political situation” and that many recognized “it would be wise to
have three-fourths of all the states to quell all doubts.” 182 In addition,
Harrison concludes that the recognition theory—which is analogous
to Amar’s Guarantee Clause argument—is “arguable but very difficult
ultimately to assess.” 183 On this point, Harrison emphasizes the lack of
a “straight answer” from Republicans on how the Southern
ratifications of the Thirteenth Amendment were valid when the ThirtyNinth Congress would later declare those governments—except
Tennessee’s—to be invalid under the First Reconstruction Act. 184
Harrison has proposed his own full-denominator theory.185
Drawing from the “standard principle of international law . . . that a
de facto government can bind a state internationally, even though that
government’s authority is usurped,” Harrison argues that the
provisional governments in the Southern States could legally ratify the
amendments. 186 Harrison finds additional support for his theory in
the Supreme Court’s Reconstruction-era decision in Texas v. White, 187
where the Court famously stated that “[t]he Constitution . . . looks to
an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States.” 188
According to Harrison, the Court’s decision endorsed a de facto
government approach, as “the Court’s compromise position was that
acts of the rebel government were effective insofar as they governed
private rights, but acts in support of the rebellion were in general
invalid and void.” 189 In concluding that any coercion was permissible,
Harrison once again analogizes to the international realm, pointing
out that “[c]oerced peace treaties are binding.” 190 As such, the
amendments are valid if “de facto governments are legally effective
and there is no duress exception.” 191

181 Harrison, supra note 16, at 379.
182 Id. at 414.
183 Id. at 379.
184 Id. at 416.
185 See id. at 422–23.
186 Id. at 436.
187 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1869).
188 Harrison, supra note 16, at 441–42 (quoting White, 74 U.S. at 725). The Court
recognized the loyal government of Texas but concluded that the rebel government’s sale
of bonds in support of the Confederacy was illegal. White, 74 U.S. at 736.
189 Harrison, supra note 16, at 443.
190 Id. at 457; see also Mazzone, supra note 13, at 1805–06 (“[L]ike the imposition of a
constitution on occupied Japan in 1946 by the Supreme Command for the Allied Powers,
the Reconstruction Amendments were imposed by the northern victors on the defeated
southern states.” (footnote omitted)).
191 Harrison, supra note 16, at 458. Harrison also resolves the rescission issue on
mootness grounds. See id. at 378 n.11.
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THE IRREGULAR ADOPTION OF THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT

The scholarly narrative ends here. The conventional story omits
the Fifteenth Amendment on the grounds that the salient problems
were mere sequels. 192 And yet, the last ratification battle had not even
started when the Fourteenth Amendment was proclaimed to be part
of the Constitution. This Essay picks up where the traditional account
leaves off.
As an initial matter, it is important to avoid anachronism about
what the Fourteenth Amendment actually accomplished. Although
the Equal Protection Clause is currently interpreted to protect the
right to vote, 193 Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment was
originally understood to exclude political rights. 194 This original
understanding was premised on the Reconstruction-era distinction
between civil and political rights, 195 as well as Section Two’s
apportionment penalty for States that denied or abridged the right to
vote of male citizens. 196 To underscore my point: even after the
Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification, half of the States barred blacks
from voting. 197 Further action was needed to prohibit racial
discrimination in voting nationwide.

192 See ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 14, at 234 (characterizing the
election of 1868 as a consolidating event); id. at 475 n.15 (“There are problems with the
Fifteenth Amendment as well, but an elaborate discussion will not advance my general
argument.”); AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 9, at 367 (calculating a true-blue
ratification for only the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments); id. at 601 n.26 (asserting
in passing that “all the Reconstruction Amendments” satisfy “a true-blue-only approach”);
Harrison, supra note 16, at 378 n.12 (“Although this Article is about all three
Reconstruction amendments, it will be necessary to discuss in detail only two, the
Thirteenth and the Fourteenth. . . . The objections to the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments are thus the same . . . .”); see also Colby, supra note 13, at 1664 n.218
(“Actually, the other Reconstruction Amendments may also be susceptible to some of the
objections raised here, but this Article does not address them.”); Green, Loyal Denominator,
supra note 11, at 49 n.3 (mentioning the Fifteenth Amendment only once and in reference
to the 1872 Democratic Party Platform’s acquiescence in its ratification).
193 The Court has interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause
to protect the right to vote in a myriad of ways. See Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1463
(2017) (racial gerrymanders); Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109–10 (2000) (ballot recount
standards); Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 441–42 (1992) (fundamental right to vote);
White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765–67 (1973) (racial vote dilution); Katzenbach v.
Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 646 (1966) (upholding Section 4(e) of the VRA); Harper v. Va. Bd.
of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966) (poll tax); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 583 (1964)
(one-person, one-vote); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 540–41 (1927) (racial vote
denial).
194 See Crum, Superfluous, supra note 3, at 1584–87.
195 See id. at 1579–81.
196 See id. at 1587–90.
197 See id. at 1602–04.
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The spark was the 1868 presidential election. Despite being a
hero from the recent war, Ulysses S. Grant won the presidency by a far
smaller margin than anticipated. Indeed, his victory in the popular
vote was attributable to black voters in the Reconstructed South. 198
The election result encouraged Radical Republicans to push for
nationwide black male suffrage. 199
When the lame-duck Fortieth Congress began debating
nationwide suffrage for black men, the first question discussed was one
of means: should Congress pass a statute, an amendment, or both? As
I have catalogued elsewhere, the Radicals’ statutory strategy failed
because moderate Republicans believed that it was unconstitutional
and politically risky. 200
Once that question was decided, Congress considered numerous
versions of the Fifteenth Amendment. Of particular relevance to the
Georgia debate, draft versions explicitly protected the right to hold
office. However, the final version omitted that language. 201 As passed
by Congress, the Fifteenth Amendment provides that “[t]he right . . .
to vote shall not be denied or abridged . . . on account of race, color,
or previous condition of servitude.”202 It also empowers Congress to
enact “appropriate” legislation to “enforce” its provisions. 203 Lash’s
superb collection sheds light on the drafting and ratification of the
Fifteenth Amendment, but its precise metes and bounds are outside
the scope of this Essay. Rather, the focus is on its irregular adoption.
The Fifteenth Amendment sailed through state legislatures in
New England and the South. In many ways, this is unsurprising. New
England had the longest experience with black male suffrage, and the
Reconstructed South had a massive influx of black voters. 204
The amendment, however, ran into trouble in the West and the
Border States. Of those States, only Missouri and Nevada ratified—
both States with relatively small black populations. 205 California
rejected the Fifteenth Amendment for xenophobic reasons related to
Chinese immigrants. 206 And in a fit of spite after the amendment’s
ratification, Oregon followed suit. 207 The remaining Border States—

198 See ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 14, at 236.
199 See Crum, Superfluous, supra note 3, at 1598–99.
200 See id. at 1604–16.
201 See LASH, VOL. 2, supra note 6, at 438–39.
202 U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
203 Id. § 2.
204 See GILLETTE, supra note 5, at 159.
205 See id. at 82 tbl.1 (showing that Missouri was 6.9% black and Nevada was 0.8% black
in 1870).
206 See FONER, supra note 2, at 108.
207 See GILLETTE, supra note 5, at 156–57.
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many of which were swing States controlled by Democrats—rejected
the amendment. 208
In this Part, I first address problems common to the
Reconstruction Amendments: the Fifteenth’s passage in a rump
Congress and the use of fundamental conditions and military
occupation. I then excavate three issues that did not squarely arise
during the Thirteenth or Fourteenth Amendments’ ratifications: a
purported rescission that was neither tardy nor mooted; a Northern
state legislature’s ratification being called into question due to a lack
of a quorum; and a readmitted Southern State’s expulsion from
Congress and the imposition of a fundamental condition for its second
readmission. I conclude by examining Secretary of State Hamilton
Fish’s proclamation of the Fifteenth Amendment’s ratification. 209
A. Common Problems
Scholars have ignored the Fifteenth Amendment because they
have assumed its irregular adoption raises the same problems as the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth’s ratifications. And in some ways, these
scholars are correct that there are common irregularities. In this
Section, I unpack the ways in which the Fifteenth Amendment’s
ratification shares those irregularities.
1. Rump Congress
The lame-duck Fortieth Congress differed from the Thirty-Eighth
and Thirty-Ninth Congresses that passed the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments in that it included several representatives
and senators from readmitted Southern States. Tennessee reentered

208 See id. at 105.
209 A few irregularities can be dismissed as inconsequential. Lash’s collection
highlights that both Kansas and Missouri’s initial ratifications based on a telegram were
improper. Kansas law did not permit such notifications, and Missouri ratified only Section
One of the Fifteenth Amendment, thereby omitting Section Two’s enforcement clause.
Both States fixed these imperfect ratifications. See LASH, VOL. 2, supra note 6, at 541. Unless
a State ratifies a constitutional amendment based on a Tweet, one would hope that this fact
pattern does not repeat itself.
In addition, Democrats argued that the Fifteenth Amendment was invalid because
“[c]hanges of this magnitude . . . were beyond the amending power” and “[l]egislatures
elected before the Amendment was proposed had no right to approve it.” Currie, supra
note 13, at 458. These arguments lack support in Article V’s text or history; they are better
characterized as political—rather than legal—objections. See, e.g., Leser v. Garnett, 258
U.S. 130, 136 (1922) (rejecting the argument that extending suffrage is beyond Article V’s
amendment authority in the context of the Nineteenth Amendment and specifically
analogizing to the Fifteenth).
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Congress in July 1866. 210 Following their ratifications of the
Fourteenth Amendment, Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia,
Louisiana, North Carolina, and South Carolina were readmitted to the
Union in summer 1868. 211 Thus, a majority of the ex–Confederate
States were back in Congress. And unlike the last time these States
sought to enter Congress, the representatives reflected a changed
electorate thanks to the First Reconstruction Act and the imposition of
fundamental conditions. The Republican Party had moved South. 212
Nevertheless, it was still a rump Congress. 213 Mississippi, Texas,
and Virginia had not yet been readmitted to the Union and were
therefore not entitled to seats in Congress. 214 Moreover, most of
Georgia’s representatives had been seated, but not its senators. 215 As
unpacked more below, Congress backtracked on Georgia’s
readmission following the expulsion of black lawmakers from its
General Assembly. 216
In February 1869, the lame-duck Fortieth Congress passed the
Fifteenth Amendment on a party-line vote. 217 In the House, the
Fifteenth Amendment passed by an overwhelming margin of 145–44,

210 See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
211 See Provisional Proclamation of Ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, 15 Stat.
706 (ratification), as reprinted in LASH, VOL. 2, supra note 6, at 422; see also BIOGRAPHICAL
DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS, 1774–2005, at 174–77 (2005), as reprinted in,
LASH, VOL. 2, supra note 6, at 439–44 (showing membership in Fortieth Congress); MALTZ,
CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 5, at 140 (discussing Southern States’ readmission).
212 See MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 5, at 142 (“Republican strength had been
enhanced with the arrival of the senators and congressmen from the newly readmitted
states.”).
213 Once again, the Republicans’ massive majorities gave the party a quorum even if
the Southern States were included. See Harrison, supra note 16, at 398 n.122 (Thirty-Ninth
Congress); id. at 378 n.11 (Thirty-Eighth Congress). In the House, there were 173
Republicans out of 226 seated members. See Congress Profiles: 40th Congress (1867–1869),
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: HIST., ART & ARCHIVES, https://history.house.gov
/Congressional-Overview/Profiles/40th/ [https://perma.cc/HXT3-N3NR]. Adding the
eighteen excluded Representatives creates a new denominator of 244, meaning that the
Republicans would have controlled over 70% of the full chamber. See infra note 221
(discussing excluded representatives). In the Senate, there were fifty-seven Republicans
and nine Democrats. See Party Division, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/history
/partydiv.htm [https://perma.cc/KS7R-EB2S]. Even adding eight senators from the four
excluded Southern States, the Republicans would have had fifty-seven of seventy-four seats.
214 See FONER, supra note 2, at 108.
215 See JOINT COMM. ON PRINTING, BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
CONGRESS, 1774–2005, H.R. Doc. No. 108-222, at 174–77 (2d Sess. 2005), as reprinted in
LASH, VOL. 2, supra note 6, at 440 (listing Georgia’s representatives); see also CONG. GLOBE,
40th Cong., 3d Sess. 2 (1868) (declining to seat Georgia’s Senator), as reprinted in LASH,
VOL. 2, supra note 6, at 445.
216 See infra subsection II.B.3.
217 See GILLETTE, supra note 5, at 73–75.
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with thirty-five abstentions. 218 In the Senate, the vote was 39–13, with
fourteen abstentions. 219 Several Radical Republicans—including
Sumner—boycotted the vote on the grounds that the amendment’s
protections were too narrow. 220
For the first time during
Reconstruction, Congress’s exclusion of the remaining rebel States
may not have been necessary for the passage of a constitutional
amendment. 221
2. Fundamental Conditions and Coercion
Pursuant to the First Reconstruction Act, the Southern States, with
the exception of Tennessee, were placed under military occupation
and required to ratify the Fourteenth Amendment. By 1869, only
Mississippi, Texas, and Virginia had not ratified the Fourteenth
Amendment and, accordingly, had not been readmitted to the
Union. 222 At that point, the Fourteenth Amendment had already
become part of the Constitution and thus this requirement was more
akin to a loyalty oath than a ratification. 223
In April 1869, the Forty-First Congress required Mississippi,
Virginia, and Texas to ratify the Fifteenth Amendment as a

218 CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 1563–64 (1869), as reprinted in LASH, VOL. 2,
supra note 6, at 536.
219 CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 1623–41 (1869), as reprinted in LASH, VOL. 2,
supra note 6, at 539.
220 See FONER, supra note 2, at 104.
221 In the House, a vote of 145 out of 189 is 76.7%, well above the two-thirds threshold.
At the time, the excluded Southern States would have been entitled to a total of eighteen
representatives: Georgia (1), Mississippi (5), Texas (4), and Virginia (8). See JOINT COMM.
ON PRINTING, BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS, 1774–2005,
H.R. Doc. No. 108-222, at 178–82 & n.93 (2d Sess. 2005) (showing the number of
representatives for Mississippi, Texas, and Virginia in the Forty-First Congress); infra
subsection II.B.3 (discussing Georgia’s excluded representative John Christy). Assuming
all of these excluded representatives would have voted against the Fifteenth Amendment,
it would have still passed, as 145 out of 207 is 70%.
In the Senate, a vote of 39 out of 52 is 75%, also well above the two-thirds threshold.
Assuming the eight Senators from Georgia, Mississippi, Texas, and Virginia would have all
voted against the Fifteenth Amendment, it would have been 39 out of 60, which is 65% and
just shy of the two-thirds threshold. However, the prospect that the amendment may not
have passed would probably have convinced at least one Radical senator to not boycott.
Indeed, contemporary press reports indicated that several Radical Senators were present
for the final vote even though they were marked as absent. See GILLETTE, supra note 5, at
76; see also Pozen & Schmidt, supra note 13, at 2349 n.154 (noting that “[i]t is less clear that
the Fifteenth Amendment would have been rejected if Congress were complete”).
222 See FONER, supra note 2, at 108.
223 Cf. Harrison, supra note 16, at 413 (describing this view of loyal-denominator
theorists).
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fundamental condition of their readmission to the Union. 224
Congress, in other words, moved the goalposts in an effort to help get
the Fifteenth Amendment over the three-fourths threshold. 225 Several
prominent Republicans—including Senators Morton and Trumbull—
expressed disagreement with this strategy. 226
Even though Congress ratcheted up the coercive pressure, the
scholarly debate has treated fundamental conditions interchangeably.
Here, I do so as well. That is because the question whether Congress
can impose fundamental conditions appears to be more salient than
whether it can stack those conditions. 227
B. Unique Problems
It has been assumed that “the objections to the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments are . . . the same, and if those objections are
not fatal to the Fourteenth they are not fatal to the Fifteenth either.” 228
But there are three distinctive problems associated with the Fifteenth
Amendment’s adoption. First, a State rescinded its ratification at a
time and in a context when it was not necessarily tardy nor moot. Thus,
the issue of rescission is more squarely presented. Second, a Northern
state legislature’s irregular ratification was called into question. The
dubious state ratifications for the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments occurred in the South. 229 And third, Georgia was
expelled from the Union after already being readmitted. Its
Senators—but not its representatives—were excluded from the lameduck Fortieth Congress when it voted on the Fifteenth Amendment.
Moreover, the Forty-First Congress excluded Georgia’s representatives,
placed the State under military rule, and required ratification of the
Fifteenth Amendment as a fundamental condition for its second
readmission.

224 See U.S. Congress, The Requirement Bill: Requiring Virginia, Mississippi, and Texas to
Ratify the Fifteenth Amendment as a Condition of Readmission, N.Y. HERALD, Apr. 10, 1869, at 3,
as reprinted in LASH, VOL. 2, supra note 6, at 559–60.
225 At the time, some Republicans believed that the fundamental conditions were
unnecessary whereas Democrats claimed that Congress imposed them to help ensure the
amendment’s ratification. See id.
226 See id.
227 See Currie, supra note 13, at 488 (“But of course Congress in 1867 had made
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment a condition of restoration to representation;
what it could do for one Amendment it could do for another as well.” (footnote omitted)).
As discussed below, Congress also imposed a fundamental condition on Georgia’s second
readmission to the Union. See infra subsection II.B.3.
228 Harrison, supra note 16, at 378 n.12.
229 To make explicit what should be apparent from my list: I treat rescissions as a
distinct problem from an irregular adoption.
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1. New York’s Rescission
New York ratified the Fifteenth Amendment on April 14, 1869. 230
After Democrats won the 1869 election, New York purported to rescind
its ratification on a party-line vote on January 5, 1870. 231
New York’s rescission was not unprecedented. Recall that New
Jersey and Ohio purported to revoke their ratifications of the
Fourteenth Amendment in early 1868. 232 But under the loyal- and
reduced-denominator theories, the Fourteenth Amendment had
become part of the Constitution several months earlier and thus the
rescissions were too late. 233 By contrast, under a full-denominator
theory, New Jersey’s and Ohio’s rescissions were mooted because a
sufficiently high number of Southern States had ratified by Seward’s
second proclamation. 234 As such, the leading theories have not had to
forthrightly address the rescission question under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Here, by contrast, rescission matters, depending on your
preferred theory. In the Appendix, I have compiled a chronology of
state ratifications and a running tally under the various theories.
Under the loyal-denominator theory, mootness does not absolve New
York’s rescission, which occurred in January 1870, before the twenty
out of twenty-seven loyal-denominator ratification threshold was
reached. In fact, New York’s ratification is essential to reach the threefourths threshold under the loyal-denominator theory. Moreover, as
unpacked below, a reduced-denominator theory that incorporates the
Reconstructed South must decide between resolving the rescission
question, the rump state legislature question, or the Georgia
question. 235 Even under a full-denominator theory, one of these three
questions must be resolved in favor of ratification. 236
One last wrinkle: one could argue that New Jersey’s ratification in
February 1871 means that the Fifteenth Amendment would have
eventually been ratified under a loyal-denominator theory. 237 That
counterfactual is problematic for two reasons. First, some context
about New Jersey. In 1869 and 1870, New Jersey was controlled by

230 See GILLETTE, supra note 5, at 84–85 tbl.2.
231 See id. at 115 n.18 (discussing Democratic victory in the 1869 election); Ratification
of the Fifteenth Amendment Rescinded, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 1870, at 1 (reporting on New York’s
rescission), as reprinted in LASH, VOL. 2, supra note 6, at 585–86.
232 See supra notes 106–10 and accompanying text.
233 See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
234 See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
235 See infra Section III.A.
236 See infra Map 3.
237 See GILLETTE, supra note 5, at 84–85 tbl.2.
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Democrats, who twice rejected the Fifteenth Amendment. 238 When
New Jersey did provide postproclamation approval in 1871, it was
controlled by Republicans. It is possible that black voters, who
overwhelmingly favored the Republican Party, 239 provided the margin
of victory in what was then a swing state. 240 Moreover, this
postproclamation approval was partially attributable to New Jersey’s
Democratic Governor, who urged acquiescence to nationwide black
male suffrage in light of the Fifteenth Amendment’s ratification. 241
Second, Congress passed the First Enforcement Act on May 31, 1870, 242
almost nine months prior to New Jersey’s ratification. If the Fifteenth
Amendment was not ratified in 1870, then this critical enforcement
legislation was largely without constitutional basis and almost certainly
would not have passed Congress. 243 Thus, New Jersey cannot be
invoked to moot out New York’s rescission.
2. Indiana’s Rump Legislature
Although there were irregularities in the South for the
ratifications of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, 244
238 Gov. Theodore Randolph’s Message to the Legislature, Note on Rejection of Amendment,
DAILY STATE GAZETTE, Mar. 25, 1869, at 3, as reprinted in LASH, VOL. 2, supra note 6, at 558–
59 (1869 rejection); Legislative Debate, Rejection of the Fifteenth Amendment, TRENTON STATE
GAZETTE, Feb. 7, 1870, as reprinted in LASH, VOL. 2, supra note 6, at 594–95 (1870 rejection).
239 See Amar & Brownstein, supra note 5, at 945; Crum, Reconstructing, supra note 5, at
307–08.
240 See GILLETTE, supra note 5, at 80 (“Th[e] Negro vote would be Republican, and it
might cost the Democrats Maryland, Delaware, and New Jersey . . . .”); id. at 113 (“In New
Jersey 4,200 potential Negro voters might well overturn an 1868 Democratic presidential
majority of 2,800.”).
241 See id. at 117; see also Green, Loyal Denominator, supra note 11, at 95–96 (noting that
New Jersey overrode a Republican governor’s veto of the rescission of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
242 An Act to Enforce the Right of Citizens of the United States to Vote in the Several
States of this Union, and for Other Purposes, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140 (1870).
243 See Xi Wang, The Making of Federal Enforcement Laws, 1870–1872, 70 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 1013, 1031–34 (1995) (summarizing the First Enforcement Act). Given that the
Fortieth Congress declined to pass a nationwide suffrage statute based on its Fourteenth
Amendment enforcement authority, see Crum, Superfluous, supra note 3, at 1602–16, it
seems unrealistic to assume that the Forty-First Congress would do so absent the Fifteenth
Amendment’s ratification.
Indeed, the First Enforcement Act was controversial
notwithstanding the Fifteenth Amendment. See Michael T. Morley, The Enforcement Act of
1870, Federal Jurisdiction over Election Contests, and the Political Question Doctrine, 72 FLA. L.
REV. 1153, 1163–72 (2020); Wang, supra, at 1021–34; but see Franita Tolson, The
Constitutional Structure of Voting Rights Enforcement, 89 WASH. L. REV. 379, 422–25 (2014)
(arguing that Congress could have passed the First Enforcement Act pursuant to Sections
Two and Five of the Fourteenth Amendment).
244 See ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 14, at 143 (discussing Johnson’s
pressuring of Southern States to ratify the Thirteenth Amendment); Colby, supra note 13,
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Indiana presents a unique problem as a Northern State whose initial
ratification is questionable.
Indiana’s ratification involved a series of political machinations.
During the 1868 campaign, Republicans nationwide and in Indiana
adopted a compromise position that advocated for black male suffrage
in the South but not the North. 245 After the Fifteenth Amendment’s
passage by Congress, Democrats cried foul. State Representative John
Coffroth, a leading Indiana Democrat, proposed that Democrats could
delay the Fifteenth Amendment’s ratification by resigning en masse to
deny the state legislature a quorum. 246 On March 5, 1869, thirty-eight
Democratic representatives and seventeen Democratic state senators
did just that, plunging the state legislature into chaos. 247 Under
Indiana’s Constitution, a quorum of two-thirds of total members was
required for each house. 248
In response, the Republican governor called for special elections
to be held on April 8, 1869, to fill the seats. 249 The Democrats promptly
won back their seats and returned to Indianapolis following an
agreement to help pass a budget and that a vote on the Fifteenth
Amendment would not occur until the end of the session. 250
On May 13, 1869, the Democrats once again decided to resign en
masse. This time, however, their plan failed. In the state senate, “the
doors were ordered locked and the roll was called.” 251 Although
sixteen state senators had sent letters of resignation to the governor,
many of them were still present in the chamber. 252 The senate’s
presiding officer ruled that, because those senators had not submitted
resignation letters to the senate, they had not yet resigned. 253 A quorum
was declared and the Fifteenth Amendment passed 27–1, with eleven
senators marked present but not voting. 254 That same afternoon,
Speaker of the Indiana House George Buskirk determined that the

at 1644 (describing Tennessee’s questionable ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment);
supra notes 38–50, 84–90 and accompanying text.
245 See Crum, Superfluous, supra note 3, at 1600–01 (discussing the 1868 Republican
Party platform); GILLETTE, supra note 5, at 131 (discussing Indiana politics).
246 See GILLETTE, supra note 5, at 131.
247 See id. at 131–32; Democrats Resign to Prevent Vote, IND. HOUSE J. 883–94 (1869), as
reprinted in LASH, VOL. 2, supra note 6, at 548–49.
248 See GILLETTE, supra note 5, at 131; IND. CONST. art. IV, § 11.
249 GILLETTE, supra note 5, at 132.
250 See id. at 135–36.
251 Id. at 137.
252 Id.
253 Id.
254 See id. An additional eleven senators were actually absent. See id. Assuming the
senate’s presiding officer’s ruling was correct concerning the resignation letters, thirty-nine
present senators constitutes a two-thirds quorum of fifty total members.
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house lacked a quorum due, in part, to the resignation of twenty-seven
Democratic representatives. 255
But the next day, Buskirk changed his mind following pressure
from Indiana’s U.S. Senator, Oliver Morton. 256 Buskirk decreed that a
vote could proceed even though only fifty-seven members were
present. 257 When pressed by Coffroth to justify this ruling, Buskirk
stated that Indiana’s Constitution required a quorum “for legislative
business of any ordinary character” but not to ratify a constitutional
amendment. 258 In other words, the ratification process, as an act of
federal lawmaking, need not follow the particularities of state law. The
Indiana House then voted 54–3 to ratify the Fifteenth Amendment. 259
As such, Indiana’s state legislature was arguably a rump legislature
when it adopted the Fifteenth Amendment. Nevertheless, Secretary
Fish ignored the quorum issue and counted Indiana as a ratifying
State. Indeed, unlike his discussion of New York and Georgia, Fish
gave no indication that anything untoward happened in Indiana. 260
3. Georgia’s Expulsion and Second Readmission
Georgia was on Congress’s mind throughout the Fifteenth
Amendment’s ratification process. In June 1868, Congress passed a
bill stating that six Southern States—Alabama, Florida, Georgia,
Louisiana, North Carolina, and South Carolina—had satisfied the First
Reconstruction Act and would be admitted upon their ratification of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 261 In late July 1868, Georgia ratified the
Fourteenth Amendment. 262 Within days, the Fortieth Congress seated

255 See id.
256 See id. at 136; The Amendment in Indiana, BOS. DAILY J., May 20, 1869, at 4, as reprinted
in LASH, VOL. 2, supra note 6, at 574.
257 See 11 BREVIER LEGISLATIVE REPORTS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF
INDIANA, SPECIAL SESSION OF 1869, at 239–44 (1869), as reprinted in LASH, VOL. 2, supra note
6, at 573. The Indiana House had 100 members and with only fifty-seven members present,
there was no finagling about the formalities of resignation to call a quorum. See 10 BREVIER
LEGISLATIVE REPORTS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 6 (1869).
258 1 BREVIER LEGISLATIVE REPORTS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF
INDIANA, SPECIAL SESSION OF 1869, at 239–44 (1869), as reprinted in LASH, VOL. 2, supra note
6, at 573.
259 See id.
260 See infra Section II.C.
261 See An Act to Admit the States of North Carolina, South Carolina, Louisiana,
Georgia, Alabama, and Florida, to Representation in Congress, 15 Stat. 73 (1868), as
reprinted in LASH, VOL. 2, supra note 6, at 417–18. Congress had already passed a similar
statute admitting Arkansas. See MALTZ, supra note 5, at 139–40.
262 See LASH, VOL. 2, supra note 6, at 544.
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six of Georgia’s seven representatives. 263 Georgia’s state legislature
selected Joshua Hill as Senator, but that selection occurred after
Congress had adjourned and therefore Hill was not seated. 264
Georgia’s military commander also handed back control to the civilian
government. 265
In September 1868, the situation changed dramatically when “a
coalition of white Republicans and Democrats voted to expel newly
elected black officials from the [Georgia] House and Senate.” 266
Specifically, three black state senators and twenty-five black
representatives were expelled. 267 Adding insult to injury, the black
state legislators were replaced by the white candidates they had
defeated at the polls. 268 Around this time, separate concerns were
raised about whether several white state legislators were disqualified by
Section Three of the Fourteenth Amendment, which prohibited rebels
who had previously sworn an oath to defend the Constitution from
holding federal or state office absent a two-thirds congressional
amnesty. 269
This development raised serious questions about whether Georgia
had backslid into rebel control and violated the fundamental
condition pertaining to black suffrage, notwithstanding that the
relevant text failed to unambiguously specify the right to hold office. 270
Although the Georgia Supreme Court would eventually rule in June
1869 that black persons had the right to hold office under the Georgia
Constitution, 271 the black officeholding debate sparked considerable
conflict between Georgia and Congress.
When the Fortieth Congress’s Third Session convened on
December 7, 1868, the Georgia question was front and center. In the
Senate, Hill was denied a seat and the matter was referred to

263 See JOINT COMM. ON PRINTING, BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
CONGRESS, 1774–2005, H.R. Doc. No. 108-222, at 174–77 (2d Sess. 2005), as reprinted in
LASH, VOL. 2, supra note 6, at 440 (listing Georgia’s representatives); CONG. GLOBE, 40th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1471–72, 4499–500 (1868) (showing admissions of Georgia’s
representatives).
264 See EDWIN C. WOOLLEY, THE RECONSTRUCTION OF GEORGIA 55, 63 (1901).
265 See LASH, VOL. 2, supra note 6, at 544.
266 Id. at 544–45.
267 See WOOLLEY, supra note 264, at 56–58. The Georgia Senate and House had 44 and
175 members, respectively. See S. REP. NO. 40-192, at 36 (1869).
268 See CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 176 (1869) (statement of Sen. Edmunds (RVT)).
269 See infra notes 401–02 and accompanying text. For a recent academic examination
of Section Three, see Gerard N. Magliocca, Amnesty and Section Three of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 36 CONST. COMM. 87 (2021).
270 See LASH, VOL. 2, supra note 6, at 544.
271 See White v. Clements, 39 Ga. 232, 266–68 (1869).
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committee. 272 Although Hill was “a Union man throughout the
war,” 273 Radical Republicans raised two objections. First, Senator
Charles Drake (R-MO) invoked the Georgia state legislature’s
expulsion of its black members, an act that “place[d] that body under
rebel control.” 274 Second, Senator John Thayer (R-NE) raised
concerns about whether Georgia’s state legislature was in compliance
with Section Three of the Fourteenth Amendment. 275 In response,
Senator John Sherman (R-OH) pointed out that Hill’s selection
occurred prior to the black officeholding controversy. 276 Sherman
further observed that the Reconstruction Committee had informed
the Union Army that it could not enforce Section Three against
Georgia and that the issue should be left to the respective house of the
state legislature. Sherman believed that precedent should be
followed. 277 Ultimately, Hill was not seated by the Fortieth Congress. 278
That same day, the Fortieth House refused to seat Georgia’s
seventh representative on the grounds that he was disqualified under
Section Three of the Fourteenth Amendment. 279 Indeed, the losing
candidate sought to be seated in his place, citing a provision of Georgia
law that permitted the winner’s replacement in such circumstances. 280
Notwithstanding the contemporaneous Senate controversy over Hill’s
seating, Georgia’s status as a State was not mentioned during this
debate, which focused solely on the Section Three issue. The matter
was referred to the Committee of Elections, and neither man became

272 See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 2 (1868), as reprinted in LASH, VOL. 2, supra
note 6, at 445.
273 CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 2 (1868) (statement of Sen. Sherman).
274 Id. (statement of Sen. Drake).
275 See id. at 5 (statement of Sen. Thayer).
276 See id. at 3 (statement of Sen. Sherman).
277 See id. at 4–5.
278 The Senate Judiciary Committee produced a divided report recommending against
seating Hill. The majority report, written by Senator Stewart (R-NV) and joined by Senators
Conkling (R-NY) and Frelinghuysen (R-NJ), reiterated the points made by Drake and
Thayer, though it put greater emphasis on the Section Three issue. See S. REP. NO. 40-192,
at 3–5 (1869). In a minority report, Senator Trumbull (R-IL) argued that Georgia had been
readmitted by Congress and further noted that the House had seated representatives from
Georgia. See id. at 33–35. Regarding the Section Three issue, Trumbull claimed that “[t]he
Senate has no jurisdiction to inquire whether the members of a State legislature are
properly elected and qualified,” id. at 37, and that, in any event, the worst case scenario was
that only “four senators out of forty-four . . . and three representatives, out of one hundred
and seventy-five, were disqualified by the 14th amendment.” Id. at 36 (emphasis omitted).
279 See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 6–7 (1868) (discussing John Christy’s
disqualification under the Fourteenth Amendment).
280 See id. (showing that John Wimpy claimed the seat).
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a representative in the Fortieth Congress. 281 Georgia’s six previously
admitted representatives remained in the Fortieth House and voted on
the Fifteenth Amendment’s final passage on February 25, 1869. 282
Georgia’s anomalous status was also debated during the counting
of the Electoral College votes for the 1868 election. Recall that in 1865,
Congress resolved to not count the electoral votes of the excluded
Southern States. 283 To effectuate that policy, Congress adopted the
22nd Joint Rule, which provided that “no [electoral] vote objected to
shall be counted except by the concurrent votes of the two Houses”
voting separately. 284 Given the “political climate” in 1865, “there was
little prospect of disagreement over which votes to reject,” and the
22nd Joint Rule was “used by Republican majorities of both Houses to
assure control over the votes of the recently rebellious southern
states.” 285
The 22nd Joint Rule remained in place for the 1868 election. 286
In addition, Congress passed a resolution in July 1868 specifying that
it would not count the Electoral College votes of the excluded Southern
281 See id.; see also JOINT COMM. ON PRINTING, BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES CONGRESS, 1774–2005, (2d Sess. 2005), as reprinted in LASH, VOL. 2, supra
note 6, at 440 (listing neither Christy nor Wimpy as representatives).
282 Representatives Clift, Gove, and Prince voted “yes,” Representative Young voted
“no,” and Representatives Edwards and Tift were marked as “not voting.” CONG. GLOBE,
40th Cong., 3d Sess. 1563–64 (1869). Although each house of Congress polices its own
membership, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, Georgia’s exclusion from the Senate but not the
House raises difficult questions given Article V’s requirement that “no State, without its
Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.” Id. art. V.
283 See supra notes 43–45 and accompanying text.
284 CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 1064 (1869); see also Stephen A. Siegel, The
Conscientious Congressman’s Guide to the Electoral Count Act of 1887, 56 FLA. L. REV. 541, 552–
53 (2004) (discussing the Civil War origins of the 22nd Joint Rule). The 22nd Joint Rule
reflected “the theory that Congress, organized as two independent houses, had ultimate
vote counting authority.” Id. at 552. The 22nd Joint Rule differs from the Electoral Count
Act of 1887, which, inter alia, flips the presumption in favor of counting electoral votes when
a State sends one slate of Electors. 3 U.S.C. § 15 (providing that “the two Houses
concurrently may reject the [electoral] vote or votes when they agree that such vote or votes
have not been so regularly given”).
Unsurprisingly, close and disputed elections have sparked scholarly and public interest
in the Electoral Count Act of 1887. See Siegel, supra; Vasan Kesavan, Is the Electoral Count
Act Unconstitutional?, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1653 (2002); L. Kinvin Wroth, Election Contests and the
Electoral Vote, 65 DICK. L. REV. 321 (1961); JOSHUA MATZ, NORMAN EISEN & HARMANN
SINGH, STATES UNITED DEMOCRACY CENTER, GUIDE TO COUNTING ELECTORAL COLLEGE
VOTES AND THE JANUARY 6, 2021 MEETING OF CONGRESS (2021). This scholarship has largely
overlooked the 1869 dispute, its relevance to the Electoral Count Act of 1887, and how it
supplies a compromise position for how to count electoral votes when a State will not
change the result.
285 Wroth, supra note 284, at 328.
286 See Siegel, supra note 284, at 554 (noting that the Senate abrogated the rule in
1876).
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States. 287 That resolution, however, did not foresee the Georgia
problem.
Grant’s victory was clear by early November 1868. 288 Even though
Georgia voted for Horatio Seymour, 289 its nine electoral votes were
insufficient to change the result. 290 Recognizing the potential for an
intraparty dispute over Georgia, a compromise was brokered and
passed on February 8, 1869, two days prior to the counting of the
electoral votes. 291 In short, both houses passed a concurrent
resolution: assuming Georgia’s electoral votes did not change the
outcome, the result would be reported in a contingent fashion and
with the final tally showing different figures depending on whether
Georgia was or was not a State. 292
287 See A Resolution Excluding from the Electoral College Votes of States Lately in
Rebellion, Which Shall Not Have Been Reorganized, 15 Stat. 257, 257–58 (1868); see also
Currie, supra note 13, at 430 (observing that Congress passed this resolution over President
Johnson’s veto).
288 See RON CHERNOW, GRANT 622–23 (2017).
289 See id. at 623 (noting that “Klan violence was rife” in Georgia).
290 Counting Georgia, Grant won 214-80. See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 1063
(1869). Even with a full-denominator of 317 electoral votes that included Mississippi, Texas,
and Virginia, Grant secured a clear majority. See United States Presidential Election of 1868,
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/print/article/1776253 [https://
perma.cc/7KCL-CPAP].
291 See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 972 (1869) (House passage); id. at 978
(Senate passage).
292 The concurrent resolution provided in full:
Whereas the question whether the State of Georgia has become and is entitled to
representation in the two Houses of Congress is now pending and undetermined;
and whereas by the joint resolution of Congress passed July 20, 1868, entitled “A
resolution excluding from the Electoral College votes of States lately in rebellion
which shall not have been reorganized,” it was provided that no electoral votes
from any of the States lately in rebellion should be received or counted for
President or Vice President of the United States until, among other things, such
State should have become entitled to representation in Congress pursuant to acts
of Congress in that behalf: Therefore,
Resolved by the Senate, (the House of Representatives concurring,) That on the
assembling of the two Houses on the second Wednesday of February, 1869, for
the counting of the electoral votes for President and Vice President, as provided
by law and the joint rules, if the counting or omitting to count the electoral votes,
if any, which may be presented as of the State of Georgia shall not essentially
change the result, in that case they shall be reported by the President of the
Senate in the following manner: Were the votes presented as of the State of
Georgia to be counted, the result would be, for —— for President of the United
States, —— votes; if not counted, for —— for President of the United States, —
— votes; but in either case —— is elected President of the United States; and in
the same manner for Vice President.
Id. at 978. The compromise was based on a “similar resolution” brokered in 1821 to deal
with Missouri’s electoral votes. Id. at 976 (statement of Sen. Edmunds); see also Kesavan,
supra note 284, at 1681–83 (surveying the 1821 dispute); Currie, supra note 13, at 431 n.292

2022]

THE LAWFULNESS OF THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT

1585

This compromise, however, was short-lived. During the joint
session of Congress on February 10, 1869, Congressman Benjamin
Butler (R-MA) sparked a constitutional crisis by demanding that
Georgia’s electoral votes be excluded. 293 Butler argued that Georgia
“had not been admitted to representation as a State in Congress,” had
failed to comply with the Constitution and the Reconstruction Acts,
and held elections that were not “free, just, equal, and fair” due to
“force and fraud.” 294 Pursuant to the 22nd Joint Rule, the Senate
retired and the two houses considered the objection separately.
In the Senate, Butler’s objection was determined to be out of
order given the February 8th concurrent resolution. 295 In other words,
the two houses had already jointly decided how to report Georgia’s
electoral votes in a contingent fashion. Nevertheless, at the insistence
of Senator Howard (R-MI), the Senate held a vote and determined
against excluding Georgia’s electoral votes. 296
By contrast, the House voted to exclude Georgia’s electoral
votes. 297 Apparently acting as if the 22nd Joint Rule governed, Speaker
of the House Schulyer Colfax (R-IN) 298 announced that “the House of
Representatives have decided that the vote of Georgia shall not be

(claiming that the 1857 dispute over Wisconsin’s electoral votes was resolved in a similar
fashion).
293 During that same joint session, a different dispute arose concerning whether
Louisiana’s electoral votes in favor of Seymour should excluded given widespread violence
at the polls. That effort was soundly rejected by both Houses. See CHERNOW, supra note
288, at 623 (discussing violence and Seymour’s victory in Louisiana); CONG. GLOBE, 40th
Cong., 3d Sess. 1050 (1869) (Senate agreeing to count Louisiana’s electoral votes by a 51-7
margin, with 8 not voting); id. at 1057 (House agreeing to count Louisiana’s electoral votes
by a 137-63 margin, with 22 not voting).
It appears that congressional leaders foresaw the fight over Georgia. Breaking with
prior tradition of listing the States either alphabetically or in the order of their admission
to the Union, the President Pro Tempore read the States in seemingly random order and
with Georgia last. See id. at 1066 (statement of Rep. Butler).
294 See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 1058 (1869) (statement of Rep. Butler).
Butler also claimed that Georgia’s electors failed to vote on the requisite day. See id. The
Senate briefly debated this point and examined how a similar situation from 1857 involving
a snowstorm in Wisconsin had been handled. See id. at 1050–51; see also Kesavan, supra note
284, at 1685–87 (discussing the Wisconsin incident).
295 See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 1054 (1869) (passing by a vote of 32-27, with
7 not voting).
296 Howard’s resolution was framed in the negative, namely “[t]hat the electoral vote
of Georgia ought not to be counted.” Id. at 1054. That resolution failed with 25 yeses, 34
noes, and 7 not voting. See id. at 1055.
297 In the House, the resolution was worded as follows: “Shall the vote of the State of
Georgia be counted . . . ?” Id. at 1059. That resolution failed by a vote of 41 yeses, 150 noes,
and 31 not voting. Id.; see also id. at 1062 (reaffirming this result).
298 JOINT COMM. ON PRINTING, BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
CONGRESS, 1774–2005, H.R. Doc. No. 108-222, at 174 (2d Sess. 2005).
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counted.” 299 At this juncture, the Senate returned to the House
chambers.
In the joint session, President Pro Tempore of the Senate
Benjamin Wade (R-OH) 300 declared that Butler’s objections were
“overruled by the Senate” and that Georgia’s electoral votes would be
reported consistent with the February 8th concurrent resolution. 301
Over Butler’s continued objections and “great uproar,” the final tally
was listed in a contingent fashion, with different numerators and
denominators depending on whether Georgia was “include[d]” or
“exclude[d]” as a State. 302 Grant was thereafter declared President. 303
Immediately afterward, Speaker Colfax—who had just been
declared Grant’s first Vice President—responded to Butler’s concerns.
Colfax argued that the concurrent resolution should trump the 22nd
Joint Rule because it was both later in time and more specific.304 In
rebuttal, Butler defended the House’s autonomy and, with ominous
rhetoric to a contemporary reader, warned against the specter of a Vice
President or President Pro Tempore using their authority to declare a
losing candidate to be President. 305 Curiously absent from this debate
about the powers of Congress to count electoral votes was the
underlying status of Georgia. 306
The situation further deteriorated when the Forty-First Congress
convened in early March 1869. The House declined to seat the six

299
300

CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. at 1059.
JOINT COMM. ON PRINTING, BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
CONGRESS, 1774–2005, H.R. Doc. No. 108-222, at 174 (2d Sess. 2005). There was no vice
president at the time, as Johnson had taken over after Lincoln’s assassination and, prior to
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, there was no constitutional mechanism to appoint a new vice
president. See Vice Presidents of the United States, U.S. SENATE, n.15, https://www.senate.gov
/about/officers-staff/vice-president/vice-presidents.htm.
301 CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. at 1062.
302 Id. at 1063.
303 See id. at 1063–64.
304 See id. at 1064 (statement of Speaker Colfax) (arguing that the “later statute must
have prevailing force”); id. (“The Chair thinks it was intended to be taken out, that
intelligent gentlemen in voting for it intended to withdraw the State of Georgia from the
operation of the twenty-second joint rule . . . .”); id. at 1067 (“But the two Houses, with the
full knowledge of that rule, by a deliberate vote took the case of Georgia outside of that
joint rule and laid down a specific rule for that case . . . .”).
305 See id. at 1064 (arguing that the proceedings were the “greatest outrage upon the
rights and privileges of this House”); id. at 1065 (discussing potential for abuse of power);
id. at 1066 (claiming that Colfax’s argument implies that the House can never unilaterally
“reverse our former action”).
306 Over the next two days, the House would debate whether to pass a censure motion
and whether to revoke the 22nd Joint Rule. See id. at 1094–1107 & 1144–48. Attempts to
reform the process failed and “thus Congress would be caught without a plan [in 1877]
when the crisis finally occurred.” Currie, supra note 13, at 432.
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Georgia representatives who had been seated by the Fortieth House. 307
Referencing the “revolutionary proceedings which have occurred” in
Georgia and the Senate’s prior decision, Representative Ward (R-NY)
moved to exclude them. 308 Other members, however, noted that these
same representatives had already been seated by the previous
Congress. 309 And therein lied the rub: the House decided against
seating Georgia’s representatives on the grounds that they had been
elected in April 1868 for both the Fortieth and Forty-First Congresses. 310
Meanwhile, without fanfare, the Forty-First Senate excluded Georgia’s
Senators. 311
Then, on March 17, 1869, Georgia’s all-white state legislature
voted against ratifying the Fifteenth Amendment—the first
Reconstructed State to do so. 312 In a strange turn of events, the tiebreaking vote in the Georgia Senate came from the Republican Senate
president. This action “may have been intended to get Congress’s
attention” about the ongoing black officeholding dispute. 313
In December 1869, the Forty-First Congress responded to
Georgia’s recalcitrance. 314 Like the debate over the ratcheting up of
fundamental conditions, moderate Republicans sounded the alarm
over this development and Radicals defended the tactic. 315 Moreover,
307 See WOOLLEY, supra note 264, at 67.
308 See CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1869) (statement of Rep. Ward).
309 See id. at 16 (statement of Rep. Farnsworth (R-IL)) (“[A]fter we have admitted
Representatives from that State to the Fortieth Congress, I think we should not stultify
ourselves by excluding the Georgia Representatives from the present Congress.”); id. at 17
(statement of Rep. Jenckes (R-RI)) (“The embarrassment in the case is this: that persons
have been admitted to seats in the Fortieth Congress from Georgia, and they are the same
persons who are now claiming seats in the Forty-First Congress.”).
310 See id. at 17 (statement of Rep. Schenck (R-OH)) (asking whether the
representatives should “lap over and take seats also in the Forty-First Congress”); id.
(statement of Rep. Farnsworth) (noting that members “often” serve in two Congresses
“whe[n] a man is elected to fill a vacancy and also for the succeeding Congress”); id. at 18
(referring the matter to the Committee on Elections); WOOLLEY, supra note 264, at 67 n.3
(noting that the Committee determined in January 1870 that Georgia’s representatives were
not qualified).
311 See CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1869) (listing Senators but omitting
Georgia).
312 See LASH, VOL. 2, supra note 6, at 545.
313 Id.
314 See GREGORY P. DOWNS, AFTER APPOMATTOX: MILITARY OCCUPATION AND THE ENDS
OF WAR 219–20 (2015) (discussing a series of Klan attacks that prompted Congress’s
involvement).
315 See LASH, VOL. 2, supra note 6, at 545 (discussing Bingham’s objections); CONG.
GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 166 (1869) (statement of Sen. Morton) (citing as favorable
precedent the fundamental conditions imposed to ratify the Fourteenth Amendment and
the fundamental conditions on Mississippi, Texas, and Virginia to ratify the Fifteenth
Amendment).
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it was hotly contested whether Georgia had violated its terms of
readmission when it expelled black lawmakers and seated former
rebels disqualified by the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as
Congress’s authority to respond to those developments. 316 In the
Reorganization Bill, Congress reimposed military oversight in Georgia
and clarified that the right to hold office could not be denied “upon
the ground of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.” 317
Congress also required Georgia to ratify the Fifteenth Amendment as
a fundamental condition of statehood. 318
When the Georgia state legislature reconvened, the Union Army
helped reseat the black lawmakers and enforce Section Three. 319 And
in February 1870, Georgia complied with the Reorganization Act and
ratified the Fifteenth Amendment. 320 Georgia also re-ratified the
Fourteenth Amendment out of an abundance of caution. 321 In July
1870, Congress approved Georgia’s second readmission to the

316 See CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 171 (1869) (statement of Sen. Bayard (DDE)) (arguing that “the right to hold office was not included under the same qualification
as the right to vote”); id. at 174 (statement of Sen. Howard) (“[Georgia] ha[s] not kept
their faith with the reconstruction acts. . . . The right to be elected to the Legislature was
as plainly provided for in the reconstruction acts as was the right to vote.”); id. at 176
(statement of Sen. Edmunds) (arguing that Georgia backslid after its readmission when it
expelled black lawmakers and refused to follow Section Three); id. at 253 (statement of
Rep. Winans (R-NV)) (arguing that the Fortieth and Forty-First Congress could each judge
the qualifications of its members); id. at 257 (statement of Rep. Fitch) (“[I]f any State
violates the conditions upon which it was permitted to become a State we have the power
to take away the corporate political existence we gave and remit the community attempting
such a fraud to the condition of political pupilage from which we suffered it to emerge.”);
id. at 257–58 (statement of Rep. Axtell (D-CA)) (arguing that this debate was precipitated
by Georgia’s rejection of the Fifteenth Amendment and the perceived necessity of its
endorsement for ratification).
317 An Act to Promote the Reconstruction of the State of Georgia, ch. 3, § 6, 16 Stat.
59, 60 (1869).
318 See LASH, VOL. 2, supra note 6, at 545.
319 See Magliocca, supra note 269, at 99 n.62.
320 See GILLETTE, supra note 5, at 84–85 tbl.2.
321 See KYVIG, supra note 13, at 182. The Reconstruction Bill did not explicitly state
that Georgia had to ratify the Fourteenth Amendment. Indeed, the Senate considered a
proposal that would have expressly provided so, but that language did not make it into the
final bill. Compare CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 165 (1869) (proposed revision that
would have required ratification of the “fourteenth and fifteenth amendments”), with An
Act to Promote the Reconstruction of the State of Georgia, ch. 3, § 8, 16 Stat. 59, 60 (1869)
(requiring only ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment). Nevertheless, at Georgia
governor’s urging, the state legislature reratified the Fourteenth Amendment. See
WOOLLEY, supra note 264, at 79.
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Union. 322 Finally, in February 1871, the Senate seated Hill, and the
South was fully readmitted to Congress. 323
C. Fish’s Proclamation
On March 30, 1870, Secretary of State Hamilton Fish proclaimed
the Fifteenth Amendment’s ratification. In his message to Congress,
Fish identified “twenty-nine States” as ratifying the Amendment:
Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New York,
North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
Texas, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. 324
Fish declared that these twenty-nine States qualified as “three
fourths of the whole number of States in the United States.” 325 Unlike
Seward’s Thirteenth Amendment proclamation and his initial
Fourteenth Amendment proclamation, 326 Fish was silent on what the
“whole number of States in the United States” actually was. In 1870,
the highest possible number of States was thirty-seven. 327 Thus, using
Fish’s numerator of twenty-nine and the highest possible denominator
of thirty-seven, the Fifteenth Amendment was adopted with 78.4% of
the States’ backing.
Fish, however, included some asterisks to his count. Fish observed
without commentary that he had received “an official document . . .
[from] the State of New York . . . claiming to withdraw the said
ratification.” 328 Fish further noted—again without commentary—that
Georgia had ratified the amendment. Tellingly, Fish included New
York but not Georgia in his list of twenty-nine States. 329
322 An Act Relating to the State of Georgia, ch. 299, 16 Stat. 363, 363–64 (1870). In so
doing, Congress expressly referenced Georgia’s ratification of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments. See id.
323 See DOWNS, supra note 314, at 236.
324 See CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 2289–90 (1870), as reprinted in LASH, VOL. 2,
supra note 6, at 595–96. I have reordered Fish’s list to be alphabetical for ease of reading.
325 Id. at 596.
326 See 13 Stat. 774–75 (1865) (Thirteenth), as reprinted in LASH, VOL. 1, supra note 6,
at 561; 15 Stat. 706 (1868) (Fourteenth), as reprinted in LASH, VOL. 2, supra note 6, at 422.
Seward, however, was silent on the whole number of States in his second proclamation
concerning the Fourteenth Amendment. See 15 Stat. 708, 708–11 (1868), as reprinted in
LASH, VOL. 2, supra note 6, at 425–27.
327 JOINT COMM. ON PRINTING, BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
CONGRESS, 1774–2005, H.R. Doc. No. 108-222, at 178–82 (2d Sess. 2005).
328 CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 2289–90 (1870), as reprinted in LASH, VOL. 2,
supra note 6, at 595.
329 Id. If one disagrees with Fish and counts Georgia, then his list includes 30 ratifying
States. That would be well above the three-fourths threshold, as 30 divided by 37 is 81%.
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What does this imply about what Fish thought about the count?
On the one hand, it is evidence that Fish considered New York’s
ratification to be valid, because otherwise he would not have included
it in his list of twenty-nine. Viewed from this perspective, Fish believed
that rescissions were improper. But on the other hand, even if New
York’s ratification was taken out of the numerator, the Fifteenth
Amendment still—barely—crossed the highest possible three-fourths
hurdle: twenty-eight out of thirty-seven is 75.7%. Thus, even in Fish’s
count, New York’s ratification was unnecessary.
Fish’s list also implies that he viewed Georgia’s ratification as even
more suspect than New York’s. After all, New York is listed in his
twenty-nine States, but Georgia is not. Fish’s list could be interpreted
to mean that Georgia is neither part of the numerator nor the
denominator. Given Georgia’s unique status and the recent intra–
Republican Party fight over its electoral votes, Fish may have adopted
a policy of strategic ambiguity toward Georgia. The fact that Fish
delayed proclaiming the Fifteenth Amendment’s ratification for
several weeks only adds to the speculation. 330
Fish’s proclamation was followed by a message from President
Grant. Acknowledging that such a message was “unusual,” Grant
declared that the Fifteenth Amendment’s ratification “completes the
greatest civil change and constitutes the most important event that has
occurred since the nation came into life.” 331 Poignantly, Grant’s
message on the Fifteenth Amendment’s ratification closed the loop
with Lincoln’s symbolic signature on the Thirteenth Amendment after
it passed Congress. 332 Of critical importance here, the fact that Grant
took this “departure from the usual custom” 333 indicates that Fish’s list
of ratifying States reflected the administration’s official position. 334
Grant’s message is also silent on the whole number of States in the
Union. Perhaps this was evidence of a reduced-denominator theory
finding a more receptive audience in the Grant administration. Or
perhaps Georgia’s unique position counseled caution.
330 See id. at 595–97; see also id. at 545 (focusing on New York and Indiana’s problematic
ratifications as cause of delay); The Amendment Complete, BOS. DAILY J., Feb. 4, 1870, at 2, as
reprinted in LASH VOL. 2, supra note 6, at 593–94 (arguing that the Fifteenth Amendment
has been ratified); GILLETTE, supra note 5, at 84–85 tbl.2 (focusing on New York and
Georgia’s problematic ratifications as reason for delay).
331 CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 2289–90 (1870), as reprinted in LASH, VOL. 2,
supra note 6, at 596.
332 See LASH, VOL. 1, supra note 6, at 378.
333 See CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 2289–90 (1870), as reprinted in LASH, VOL. 2,
supra note 6, at 596.
334 Grant had previously endorsed the Fifteenth Amendment’s ratification in his
inaugural address, and he had recommended against the Radicals’ plan to pass a
nationwide suffrage statute. See Crum, Superfluous, supra note 3, at 1613 & n.436.
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Although the above-recounted objections have been overlooked
by modern scholars, they were vigorously debated at the time. Senator
Vickers, for example, disputed the Fifteenth Amendment’s ratification
shortly after Fish’s proclamation. 335 By 1872, however, the controversy
simmered down, as the Democratic Party acquiesced to all three
amendments’ ratifications. 336
III.

PROBLEMATIZING THE LEADING THEORIES

How do the theories of the lawfulness of the Reconstruction
Amendments fare after the inclusion of the Fifteenth Amendment? In
this Section, I examine each theory ad seriatim. I conclude that the
Fifteenth Amendment is most problematic for the loyal- and reduceddenominator theories because it requires (1) a fleshed-out account of
when to start readding States to the denominator and (2) addressing
questions not raised during the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments’ adoptions. Regarding Ackerman’s dualist theory, the
Fifteenth Amendment’s inclusion requires pushing back the
consolidating event for the Reconstruction constitutional moment by
two years. As for Amar’s Guarantee Clause and Harrison’s de facto
government theories, the Fifteenth Amendment is relatively easy to
incorporate.

335 See CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3480–85 (1870) (statement of Sen. Vickers)
(providing a laundry list of objections); Currie, supra note 13, at 458 (noting prevalence of
doubts about Fifteenth Amendment’s validity).
336 See Green, Loyal Denominator, supra note 11, at 48–49.
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A. Loyal- and Reduced-Denominator Theories
As with the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, the
conventional view of the Fifteenth Amendment’s ratification eschews
ambiguity. States either voted to ratify or not. The conventional map
of the Fifteenth Amendment’s ratification appears below, with
ratifying States in green, nonratifying States in red, and territories in
black. 337
MAP 1 338
Total Ratifications: 30 Total States: 37 Ratification Rate: 81%

This map has thirty-seven States, meaning that twenty-eight
ratifications are necessary. Here, there are thirty ratifications, easily
clearing the three-fourths threshold.

337 By non-ratifying, I mean that the State had either rejected or failed to act on the
Fifteenth Amendment when Fish made his proclamation. As such, this is a snapshot in
time.
In 1869, the federal territories were Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, New Mexico,
Oklahoma, Utah, Washington, Wyoming, and (the unified) Dakota. Even though DC is not
a territory, I have included it with this group. As a recent acquisition from Russia, Alaska
was considered a military district, not a territory. Hawaii had not been annexed yet. See
Crum, Superfluous, supra note 3, at 1603 n.364. Although I have used a so-called logo map
of our nation, the United States had not acquired its overseas empire by 1869. Cf. DANIEL
IMMERWAHR, HOW TO HIDE AN EMPIRE: A HISTORY OF THE GREATER UNITED STATES 8–9
(2019) (critiquing the logo map’s omission of overseas territories).
338 Maps created using MAPCHART, https://www.mapchart.net/.
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Moving past the conventional map, Fish’s proclamation map looks
different. Given Fish’s asterisks, I have marked Georgia and New York
as problematic States by coloring them yellow:
MAP 2
Clear Ratifications: 28 Problem States: GA & NY
Total States: Unstated Ratification Rate: > 75%

As noted above, it is unclear how Fish counted Georgia, meaning
this map could be interpreted as having either thirty-six or thirty-seven
States. Regardless, the Fifteenth Amendment passes muster using
Fish’s list. 339

339

See supra notes 328–30 and accompanying text.
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Fish’s list, however, obscures how many problematic States there
really were. Fish’s map ignores Indiana’s rump legislature and the
fundamental conditions imposed on Mississippi, Texas, and Virginia.
With these changes made, here’s a new map:
MAP 3
Clear Ratifications: 24 Problem States: GA, IN, MS, NY, TX & VA
Total States: 37 Ratification Threshold: 4 More States

Based on a full-denominator theory, this map has thirty-seven
States, meaning that twenty-eight ratifications are necessary. This map
shows that only twenty-four States have clear ratifications and that six
States’ ratifications are problematic. As such, you need a theory—or
theories—that gets you to four. The quickest route to ratification is to
build off the precedent set by the Fourteenth Amendment and to
count
the
Reconstructed
Southern
States’
ratifications
notwithstanding the fundamental conditions. That gets you three
States: Mississippi, Texas, and Virginia. Thus, you need one more
State. If you assume Georgia’s second fundamental condition is valid,
then you can forget about Indiana or New York. But if Georgia is out,
then you must approve Indiana’s rump legislature’s ratification or view
New York’s rescission as invalid.
Alternatively, if you consider fundamental conditions (or their
stacking) to be unduly coercive and you include those States in the
denominator, then there’s no way to reach the three-fourths threshold.
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Turning away from the full-denominator theories, does a loyaldenominator map solve this problem? I have blacked out the States
that purportedly seceded, in addition to the territories.
MAP 4
Clear Ratifications: 18 Problem States: IN & NY Total States: 26
Ratification Threshold: IN and NY

This map has twenty-six States, meaning that twenty States are
needed for ratification. Thus, you need to count both Indiana and New
York as ratifications under a loyal-denominator theory. This is
troubling for Amar’s true-blue theory because he has argued that
States have a right to rescind prior to ratification. 340 To be valid as to
the Fifteenth Amendment, Amar’s true-blue theory needs to be
classified as a reduced-denominator theory, a point that he gestures
toward in his book’s endnotes when he includes Tennessee in the
Fourteenth Amendment’s denominator given its voluntary
ratification. 341

340 See AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 9, at 456 (arguing in favor of a
“last-in-time” idea because any other rule would “feature a perverse ratchet”); id. at 601
n.19 (noting that there are “good reasons for permitting rescission until the three-quarters
bar is cleared” and that “Ohio and New Jersey should not have been counted as yes votes”
for the Fourteenth Amendment).
341 See id. at 601 n.22 (including Tennessee in the count); id. at 603 n.35 (describing
Tennessee’s readmission).
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Now, maybe your view of loyalty includes States that have been
Reconstructed. Amar hedged by counting Tennessee in his endnote’s
count of true-blue States. 342 Green counts Tennessee’s ratification of
the Fourteenth Amendment as a loyal state. More significantly, Green
considers Articles I and V’s definitions of “States” to be coextensive,
meaning that the six fully Reconstructed Southern States should be
counted.
Here’s a reduced-denominator map that includes States that have
been fully and unquestionably admitted to the Union. Mississippi, Texas,
and Virginia are excluded, as is Georgia:
MAP 5
Clear Ratifications: 24 Problem States: IN & NY Total States: 33
Ratification Threshold: IN or NY

In this map, there are thirty-three States, meaning that twenty-five
States must ratify. This requires counting either Indiana or New York’s
ratifications.

342

See id. at 601 n.22
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Suppose you want a reduced dominator but you’re queasy about
what happened to Georgia. 343 Out of an abundance of caution, you
include Georgia in the denominator. Here’s your map:
MAP 6
Clear Ratifications: 24 Problem States: GA, IN & NY
Total States: 34 Ratification Threshold: 2 of 3 Problem States

This map has thirty-four States, meaning you need twenty-six
ratifications. Accordingly, you need to count two of the three yellow
States: Georgia, Indiana, and New York.
What these permutations of maps demonstrate is that, for the
Fifteenth Amendment, any theory—whether loyal, reduced, or fulldenominator—requires answering at least one question left
unresolved by the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments: namely,
whether rescissions are valid; whether a Northern rump state
legislature’s ratification is acceptable; and whether a Reconstructed
Southern State can be kicked out of the Union and required to ratify
an amendment for its second readmission.

343 For Green, this map is potentially necessary, as Georgia was readmitted to the
House but not the Senate. See GILLETTE, supra note 5, at 85. In other words, Georgia was
not treated consistently for Article I purposes.
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B. Ackerman’s Dualist Theory
According to Ackerman, the Constitution can be amended
outside of Article V’s strictures during periods of higher lawmaking.
Ackerman viewed the constitutional moment of Reconstruction as
consolidating with the 1868 election. 344 Accordingly, he focused on
the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. 345 As to the final
Reconstruction Amendment, he recognized that “[t]here are
problems with the Fifteenth Amendment as well, but an elaborate
discussion will not advance my general argument.” 346
Incorporating the Fifteenth Amendment into Ackerman’s
narrative is deeply problematic. Indeed, the 1868 election cannot
properly be viewed as the consolidating event of a constitutional
moment. As this Essay has shown, the case for the Fifteenth Amendment’s ratification is more complicated than traditionally assumed.
The problem of rescission and the imposition of fundamental
conditions—especially as to Georgia—would counsel against counting
the Fifteenth Amendment’s ratification as normal politics under
Ackerman’s framework. 347
This pushes Ackerman’s timeline back by—at least—two years. At
that point, what is the consolidating event? Some possibilities include:
the Enforcement Acts; Grant’s reelection; and Congress’s passage of
the Civil Rights Act of 1875. But by then, the Compromise of 1877 and
Redemption loom large. 348
Indeed, in his prominent critique of Ackerman’s dualist theory,
McConnell argues that Redemption satisfies the criteria for being a
constitutional moment. McConnell’s analysis, however, assumes

344 See ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 14, at 234.
345 See id. at 100–09.
346 Id. at 475 n.15. If he had ended his Reconstruction story with the Fifteenth
Amendment, Ackerman could have highlighted the Radical Republicans’ final
constitutional victory: the nationwide enfranchisement of black men and the creation of
the world’s first multi-racial democracy.
347 See id. at 111 (criticizing fundamental conditions); id. at 112 (highlighting the
rescission issue). Although there’s no directly analogous situation to the Indiana problem,
Ackerman’s skepticism of the rump Congress indicates that he would find a rump state
legislature to also be problematic. See id. at 104.
348 In his response to McConnell, Ackerman argues that neither the midterm election
of 1874 nor the 1876 presidential election were signals of the start of a new Jim Crow
constitutional moment. See id. at 472 n.126 (“Nothing happened between 1874 and 1876
that remotely qualifies” as a “signal[].”). Ackerman further notes that the Hayes
Administration’s policies vis-à-vis the South “represent[] a return to normal politics.” Id. at
473 n.126. Given this latter comment, it seems difficult to push back Ackerman’s
constitutional moment to the end of Reconstruction and remain consistent with his original
position.
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Ackerman’s end date. 349 If one were to include the Fifteenth
Amendment as part of Ackerman’s story, then McConnell’s critique
might shift from a separate constitutional moment to questioning
whether Ackerman’s moment ever did, in fact, consolidate.
C. Amar’s Guarantee Clause Theory
Amar’s Guarantee Clause theory seeks to justify excluding the
Southern States and administering the strong medicine of
fundamental conditions. In other words, Amar is primarily concerned
with the legitimacy of the First Reconstruction Act. The inclusion of
the Fifteenth Amendment helps underscore that Congress’s power
under the Guarantee Clause is strongest in the territories, rather than
in the States themselves. 350 After all, the Fortieth Congress rejected the
Radicals’ attempt to use the Guarantee Clause to enfranchise black
men in the States. 351
Given that, for this theory, Amar uses a full denominator and is
comfortable with fundamental conditions, he only needs to get one
State out of the New York, Indiana, and Georgia triumvirate. 352 New
York is out, in light of Amar’s views on rescission and the timing of New
York’s rescission. 353
Indiana is unlikely to raise red flags for Amar, as he defers to
Congress’s judgment on the Guarantee Clause. Although Amar’s
focus is on the Reconstructed South rather than the North, it would
appear that Amar would view Indiana’s rump legislature as satisfying
the republicanism threshold.
Finally, given Amar’s aggressive view on republicanism and
congressional authority, the Georgia situation does not seem like a line
he would mind crossing. 354 To be sure, Amar would have to explain
why Georgia’s postadmission expulsion can legitimately revert it back
to a de facto territory. But in any event, Georgia is not necessary under
Amar’s full-denominator theory if Indiana’s ratification counts.

349 See McConnell, supra note 167, at 122.
350 See AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 9, at 379 (analogizing the
Reconstructed South to the western territories).
351 See Crum, Superfluous, supra note 3, at 1607, 1614–15.
352 See supra Map 3.
353 See supra notes 231–43 and accompanying text.
354 Indeed, in discussing Georgia, Amar does not seem bothered by Congress’s actions.
See AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 9, at 400 n.*.
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D. Harrison’s De Facto Government Theory
Overall, Harrison’s theory is not too impacted by the Fifteenth
Amendment’s ratification. 355 Harrison is primarily concerned with
legitimating the actions of the provisional Southern governments. In
his view, these governments had authority to do a myriad of legal
actions with constitutional significance, from issuing marriage licenses
to ratifying an amendment.
Because Harrison adopts a fulldenominator theory and he approves of the use of fundamental
conditions, there’s a fair amount of play in the joints. 356 Harrison
needs to answer only one of the three unique questions.
On rescission, Harrison resolved that question in the Fourteenth
Amendment context on mootness grounds. 357 As that question can
again be dodged here, I bracket it under Harrison’s approach.
On Indiana, Harrison’s approach would appear to recognize the
actions of Indiana’s rump state legislature. After all, if the dubiously
established and later voided southern legislatures could bind their
States, 358 then what occurred in Indiana is small potatoes. A
questionable quorum in the state senate and a clear lack of a quorum
in the state house are “defects in their claim to sovereign power,” but
those institutions can nonetheless bind Indiana. 359
Then there’s Georgia. In dismissing the problematic aspects of
fundamental conditions and other forms of coercion, Harrison
analogizes to peace treaties, pointing out that involuntary consent does
not void such treaties. 360 That comparison may be persuasive for the
South’s initial readmission to the Union, but it is not as convincing as
to Georgia’s second readmission. It is, at best, analogized to a
renegotiated peace treaty. In any event, Harrison’s theory would
probably recognize Indiana’s ratification and thus Georgia is
unnecessary.
IV.

JUSTIFYING THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT

No one seriously contends that the Reconstruction Amendments
should be stricken from the Constitution. Nevertheless, to put any
doubts to rest, I address each of the three unique problems raised by
the Fifteenth Amendment’s irregular adoption.
Furthermore,
355 For a discussion of how the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in the two Zivotofsky
cases may complicate Harrison’s theory, see infra Section IV.A.
356 See supra Map 3.
357 See Harrison, supra note 16, at 378 n.11.
358 See id. at 422–23 (arguing that “de facto state governments may take legally effective
action on behalf of the states they govern”).
359 See id. at 423.
360 See id. at 457.

2022]

THE LAWFULNESS OF THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT

1601

although the thrust of this Essay has been to focus on flaws, there is a
sunnier side to the Fifteenth Amendment’s ratification.
A. Legal Justifications
In my view, New York and Indiana should count as ratifying the
Fifteenth Amendment. That is because rescissions are improper and
Congress’s recognition of Indiana’s ratification is conclusive and
binding under the Supreme Court’s decision in Coleman v. Miller. 361
With those two States in the “yes” column, the Fifteenth Amendment
is valid under any denominator. To be sure, Georgia’s ratification is
particularly dubious but, thankfully, it does not matter.
For the sake of brevity and because others have dealt with the common
problems, I focus on the unique problems associated with the Fifteenth
Amendment’s ratification. 362
1. Rescission
On the rescission question, there are three potential bright-line
rules: first-in-time, last-in-time, and antirescission. Here, I endorse an
antirescission rule: once a State ratifies an amendment, that action is a
one-way ratchet.
An antirescission rule is best justified based on past practice and
prudential considerations. Article V references only Congress and the
state legislatures/conventions as having any role to play in the
amendment process—the president and the judiciary are not
mentioned. To be sure, Article V’s text leaves out who the “decider”
is for when an amendment becomes “[p]art of this Constitution,” 363
but the federal Congress makes sense over the state legislatures. And
as David Pozen and Tom Schmidt recently explained, “As the most
geographically representative, deliberatively transparent, and
electorally accountable branch, Congress will in general be best

361 See 307 U.S. 433, 456 (1939). I do not consider Coleman to be dispositive for New
York and Georgia given the proverbial asterisks on those States’ ratification on Fish’s list.
362 On the rump Congress issue, I agree that the conventional justifications are
sufficient: namely, that a quorum existed notwithstanding the South’s exclusion and that
each house can determine the qualifications of its members. On the permissibility of
fundamental conditions, I find both Amar’s and Harrison’s accounts to be plausible. In my
view, these theories are not mutually exclusive and operate from a premise not dissimilar
from the Radicals’ theory that the Southern States forfeited their rights as States when they
seceded. In justifying how Congress treated these new quasi-territories, Amar relies on the
Guarantee Clause whereas Harrison borrows from international law principles. AMAR,
AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 9, at 374; Harrison, supra note 16, at 436.
363 U.S. CONST. art. V; see also Pozen & Schmidt, supra note 13, at 2378 (noting this
problem).
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positioned to determine whether an amendment has gained broad
social acceptance and to generate additional political support once
such a determination has been made.” 364
Turning from who decides to what bright-line rule to adopt, there
is historical precedent for an antirescission rule. Indeed, both
Congress and the relevant Secretary of State counted States that had
purportedly rescinded when proclaiming the ratifications of the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. 365 Since then, several voting
rights amendments have been adopted that clearly presume the
Fifteenth’s validity. 366 Furthermore, the Court approvingly cited the
Fourteenth Amendment “precedent” of Congress’s refusal to
recognize either “previous rejection or attempted withdrawal” in
concluding that it is a nonjusticiable political question whether a
constitutional amendment has been ratified. 367 This historical gloss
should be followed here. 368
Turning to prudential concerns, an antirescission rule would put
state legislatures on notice that ratifications are final. Indeed, one
could analogize ratification to the decision to join the Union—and the
Civil War clearly established that secession is unconstitutional. And
rather than creating a “perverse ratchet,” 369 an antirescission rule
would eliminate the incentive for a State to sow chaos by attempting to
revoke a ratification.

364 Pozen & Schmidt, supra note 13, at 2381.
365 See supra subsection I.A.2, Section II.C. Indeed, the House passed a resolution
following the Fifteenth Amendment’s ratification stating that States cannot rescind their
ratifications. See CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 1st Sess. 5356–57 (1870). And during the
Progressive era, an attempt to expressly permit rescissions went nowhere. See KYVIG, supra
note 13, at 251–53.
366 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (sex discrimination); id. amend. XXIV (poll tax); id.
amend. XXVI (age discrimination); see also Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130, 136 (1922)
(rejecting challenge to Nineteenth Amendment’s validity and noting that the Fifteenth
Amendment had been “recognized and acted on for half a century”).
367 Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 450 (1939). For more on Coleman, see infra
subsection IV.A.2.
368 See Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of
Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411, 416 (2012) (canvassing the “role of historical practice in the
separation of powers context”). Post-ratification practice has spawned considerable
academic interest in recent years. My argument for historical gloss based on the
Reconstruction Amendments would differ from a liquidation approach, which focuses on
events more proximate to the relevant ratifying date. See William Baude, Constitutional
Liquidation, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1, 4 (2019) (advocating for “James Madison’s theory of
postenactment historical practice, sometimes called ‘liquidation’”); Aziz Z. Huq, The
Function of Article V, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1165, 1233 (2014) (arguing that “historical practice
ought to matter if it emerged in the first few decades of constitutional history, but perhaps
less so otherwise”).
369 AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 9, at 456.
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By contrast, neither the “first-in-time” nor the “last-in-time” rules
have been followed by Congress. 370 And the specter that rescissions are
valid has not reduced confusion—a typical justification of rules over
standards. 371 For proof, just look at the lengthy discussion in this Essay
and other academic articles on this question. 372
2. Recognizing Rump State Legislatures
Next up is Indiana’s rump state legislature. No other Northern
State had a comparable problem during the ratification process of the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. As such, Indiana presents a
unique problem for the Fifteenth Amendment. 373
Under current doctrine, this is a relatively straightforward
question. Put simply, it is up to Congress to decide whether Indiana’s
ratification is valid. And here, neither Congress nor Fish raised any
such objections.
In Coleman v. Miller, 374 half of the members of the Kansas state
senate challenged Kansas’s ratification of the Child Labor
Amendment, which was obtained after Kansas’s Lieutenant Governor
cast the tie-breaking vote in the state senate. 375 The senators made two
arguments. First, they claimed that the ratification was invalid based
on the Lieutenant Governor’s involvement. The Court divided equally
on this point. 376 Second, they argued that the ratification was invalid
because of Kansas’s previous rejection of the amendment and the lapse
of time between Congress’s submission and Kansas’s purported
adoption. On this point, a deeply fractured Court concluded that
370 See id. (collecting examples); id. at 626 n.46 (same).
371 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, The Mead Doctrine: Rules and Standards, Meta-Rules and
Meta-Standards, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 807, 820 (2002) (“Rules are generally more predictable
and easier to enforce than standards.”).
372 Indeed, the ongoing litigation over the Equal Rights Amendment involves a
rescission issue. See Virginia v. Ferriero, 525 F. Supp. 3d 36, 61 (D.D.C. 2021) (declining to
resolve “whether states can validly rescind prior ratifications”); see also Pozen & Schmidt,
supra note 13, at 2378–80 (discussing the confusion wrought by this litigation).
373 Recall that Indiana House Speaker Buskirk determined that the Indiana
Constitution’s heightened quorum requirement applied solely to normal legislative
business rather than the ratification of a federal constitutional amendment. See supra
subection II.B.2. Buskirk’s position finds some support in Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221
(1920). There, the Supreme Court held that Ohio could not use a referendum to ratify a
federal constitutional amendment. In so holding, the Court opined that “the power to
ratify a proposed amendment to the Federal Constitution has its source in the Federal
Constitution.” Id. at 230. Because I find Congress’s recognition power under Article V to
be the stronger—and sufficient—argument, I merely flag Hawke’s potential relevance,
rather than rely on it.
374 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
375 See id. at 435–37.
376 See id. at 446–47.
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whether a constitutional amendment has been ratified presents a
nonjusticiable political question. 377
Sometimes, law is just politics by other means. But here, politics
is law. Congress’s recognition decisions under Article V are unreviewable by courts and political considerations can be paramount. As such,
Congress can make difficult judgment calls that need not conform with
established practice. 378

377 See id. at 450; id. at 459 (Black, J., concurring) (“Congress has sole and complete
control over the amending process, subject to no judicial review . . . .”). Intriguingly, Amar
does not rely on Coleman in support of his Guarantee Clause argument. According to Amar,
some Justices in Coleman “appeared to think that the Reconstruction Amendment process
had established in practice that Congress would be the sole ex post judge of ratification
timing issues.” AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 9, at 626 n.49 (emphasis
added). Amar thinks this reading goes too far and that the “narrower and sounder reading
of the Reconstruction precedent is that Congress is properly the judge of state
republicanism, insofar as that issue bears on Article V” and that “Congress is not necessarily
the judge of all other Article V issues.” Id. For more on Coleman, see Michael Stokes
Paulsen, A General Theory of Article V: The Constitutional Lessons of the Twenty-Seventh
Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 677, 707–21 (1993).
Coincidentally, the Indiana Supreme Court adopted a similar approach to Coleman in
Evans v. Browne, 30 Ind. 514 (1869), which involved the same mass resignation of
Democratic state legislators. In Evans, an attorney sought payment of $1500 based on a bill
that the rump Indiana state legislature had enacted. Id. at 514–15. In upholding the
attorney’s right to payment, the Indiana Supreme Court determined that “courts cannot
look beyond the enrolled act and its authentication.” Id. at 527. Thus, even at the state
level, separation-of-powers concerns counsel against judicial second-guessing of a law’s
compliance with legislative procedure.
378 In a pair of decisions in the 2010s, the Court addressed whether Congress could
dictate that the passport of a child born in Jerusalem have his place of birth listed as “Israel.”
In Zivotofsky v. Clinton (Zivotofsky I), 566 U.S. 189 (2012), the Court held that cases involving
the foreign recognition power were not political questions. In other words, the Court could
adjudicate the dispute. See id. at 191, 201. Then, in Zivotofsky v. Kerry (Zivotofsky II), 135 S.
Ct. 2076 (2015), the Court invalidated the relevant passport statute on the grounds that it
usurped the president’s foreign recognition power. See id. at 2096.
The Zivotofsky cases are problematic for three reasons. First, Zivotofsky I displays a
willingness by the Court to intervene in recognition decisions in the international realm,
where the political branches have historically been given wide leeway. Second, Zivotofsky II
signaled the Court’s willingness to invalidate congressional oversight of the executive
branch. Last but not least, these decisions appear at odds with the Court’s rationale in
Coleman, which declared that recognition of constitutional amendments was a nonjusticiable political question. Coleman’s upshot is that Congress gets to decide such matters.
At the end of the day, the foreign recognition power was deemed to belong to the
president. Zivotofsky II, 135 S. Ct. at 2096. The same cannot be said for the Article V
recognition power, which does not expressly include the president at all. Indeed, other
than Lincoln’s symbolic signature on the Thirteenth Amendment, presidents have been
largely excluded from the constitutional amendment process. Given that constitutional
amendments must satisfy a two-thirds threshold—the same as a veto override—it makes
sense that the president is excluded.
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3. The Georgia Problem
Georgia presents the hardest question. It is one thing to exclude
the South from Congress when it initially requests readmission after
the Civil War. It is another thing entirely to readmit Georgia and seat
its representatives, exclude its senator in response to the black officeholding dispute and Section Three controversy, have its
representatives vote on the Fifteenth Amendment, and then kick it out
of the Union entirely and require it to ratify the Fifteenth Amendment.
Although each house of Congress polices its own membership,379
Georgia’s exclusion from the Senate but not the House raises difficult
questions given Article V’s requirement that “no State, without its
Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.” 380
To the extent that Georgia’s expulsion was in response to its
exclusion of black lawmakers, it is important to note that Congress was
itself debating similar questions around the same time. Various drafts
of the Fifteenth Amendment explicitly protected a right to hold office,
but the version that ultimately passed Congress did not. 381 To be sure,
one could view political rights as an indivisible bundle, 382 but there are
numerous examples of the Reconstruction Congress differentiating
between the franchise and office-holding. 383

379 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5.
380 Id. art. V.
381 See LASH, VOL. 2, supra note 6, at 438–39. Moreover, in February 1870, Senate
Democrats tried and failed to exclude the first black Senator, Hiram Revels, on the grounds
that he had not been a citizen for the requisite number of years. The Democrats based
their argument on Dred Scott’s holding that black persons could not be citizens of the United
States. And because Dred Scott was only abrogated by the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868,
their argument went, Revels had not been a citizen for the requisite nine years. See Richard
A. Primus, The Riddle of Hiram Revels, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1681, 1682 (2006).
382 See Vikram David Amar, Jury Service as Political Participation Akin to Voting, 80
CORNELL L. REV. 203, 227–29 (1995).
383 In imposing fundamental conditions, the readmission statutes for Mississippi,
Texas, and Virginia all differentiate between the right to vote and hold office. See An Act
to Admit the State of Virginia to Representation in the Congress of the United States, ch.
10, 16 Stat. 62, 63 (1870) (protecting separately the “right to vote” and the “right to hold
office”); see also An Act to Admit the State of Mississippi to Representation in the Congress
of the United States, ch. 19, 16 Stat. 67, 68 (1870) (same); An Act to Admit the State of
Texas to Representation in the Congress of the United States, ch. 39, 16 Stat. 80, 81 (1870)
(same).
Indeed, following Georgia’s expulsion of black lawmakers, Congress began
distinguishing between the right to vote and hold office. Compare FONER, supra note 2, at
108 (describing the fundamental conditions imposed on Mississippi, Texas, and Virginia),
and An Act to Promote the Reconstruction of the State of Georgia, ch. 3, § 6, 16 Stat. 59, 60
(1869) (protecting the right to hold office), with MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 5, at 138–
40 (discussing early fundamental conditions limited to the right to vote).
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Georgia’s situation, moreover, cannot be viewed in isolation. As
David Kyvig explained, “[t]he [readmitted Southern] states, observing
how Georgia had regained self-government, then lost it a second time
by ignoring Reconstruction mandates, no doubt felt pressure to
ratify.” 384 If Georgia could be reexpelled from the Union for failing to
accept black lawmakers and for rejecting the Fifteenth Amendment,
then what would stop the Reconstruction Congress from doing the
same thing to another recalcitrant State?
Thankfully, as the Fifteenth Amendment’s validity does not hinge
on Georgia, I need not resolve the Georgia enigma. 385
B. Normative Takeaways
The Fifteenth Amendment complied with Article V’s strictures
under a variety of theories. Before this Essay concludes, I want to
briefly highlight two normative points. First, the Fifteenth Amendment was the first constitutional provision whose existence is clearly
attributable to the votes of black men under the reduced- or fulldenominator theories. 386 Second, the fight to ratify the Fifteenth
Amendment—indeed, all of the Reconstruction Amendments—bears
a striking resemblance to numerous en vogue theories of constitutional
law, such as militant democracy, political process theory, and
constitutional hardball.
1. The Importance of Black Ballots
As Eric Foner has observed, “the biracial governments in the
South, elected in large measure by black voters, proved crucial to [the
Fifteenth Amendment’s] ratification.” 387 When the Thirteenth
Amendment was ratified, only five New England States with miniscule
384 KYVIG, supra note 13, at 182.
385 See supra Section III.A (showing which States’ ratifications are necessary under each
theory).
One final point about Georgia. This fact pattern raises concerns about the validity and
timing of Georgia’s ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. After all, the state legislature
that ratified the Fourteenth Amendment was the one who’s actions precipitated the
exclusion of Georgia’s senator and the reimposition of military rule. In many ways, this is
a redux of how the Thirty-Ninth Congress treated the South for purposes of the
Thirteenth’s ratification and the Fourteenth’s passage. And under the full-denominator
theory, Georgia’s valid ratification in July 1868 is necessary to avoid deciding the rescission
question. See AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 9, at 601 n.19.
386 I do not make this claim for the loyal-denominator theory because black voters were
such a small percentage of the electorate in the Northern States that had enfranchised black
men. See GILLETTE, supra note 5, at 27 (“By the end of 1868, . . . no northern state with a
relatively large Negro population had voluntarily accepted full Negro suffrage.”).
387 FONER, supra note 2, at 108.
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black populations had enfranchised black men. The same was true for
when Congress passed the Fourteenth Amendment in 1866. 388
Although black men voted in large numbers for the Southern State
legislatures that ultimately ratified the Fourteenth Amendment, those
assents were obtained through fundamental conditions, and thus a
cloud hangs over them. 389
By contrast, that concern does not exist for six of the Southern
States that ratified the Fifteenth Amendment. The governments of
Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Louisiana, North Carolina, and South
Carolina had been fully reconstructed. 390 In addition, the lame-duck
Fortieth Congress had several Republican members elected with the
support of black voters. 391
The narrative that the North compelled the South to ratify all of
the Reconstruction Amendments is an oversimplification that erases
the role of black voters in the Fifteenth Amendment’s adoption. After
the North transformed the South via the First Reconstruction Act,
“Northern white Republicans . . . linked arms with new Southern black
voters and black lawmakers to reform the North and also cement
voting rights in the South.” 392 The Fifteenth Amendment not only
protected black men’s right to vote, but its existence was also
attributable to those black men who could already vote.
2. Reconstructing Democracy
Following the Civil War, the Reconstruction Framers were
confronted with an unprecedented task: transforming a former slave
society into a multiracial democracy. 393 To accomplish their admirable
and ambitious goal, the Framers employed a variety of stratagems that
bear a striking similarity to contemporary theories about preserving
and strengthening democracy. In this final subsection, I provide a
brief sketch of these similarities; a more thorough account is for a
future piece. And to be clear, by mapping out the similarities between
Reconstruction and contemporary theories, I do not claim that the
388 See Crum, Superfluous, supra note 3, at 1593.
389 See, e.g., Colby, supra note 13, at 1668 (arguing that the Reconstructed Southern
governments “acted at gunpoint” and “had been given no choice but to ratify, and it is
impossible to say with any confidence that their ratification votes were voluntary”).
390 See MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 5, at 140 (discussing these States’
readmissions); infra Appendix (noting these States’ ratifications of the Fifteenth
Amendment).
391 See Congress Profiles: 40th Congress (1867–1869), U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:
HIST.,
ART
&
ARCHIVES,
https://history.house.gov/Congressional-Overview
/Profiles/40th/ [https://perma.cc/HXT3-N3NR]
392 AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 9, at 397.
393 See FONER, supra note 50, at xx.
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threats facing democracy today—although very dire and significant by
recent standards—are comparable to the widespread violence and
chaos that characterized the post–Civil War South.
In many ways, the Reconstruction Framers’ behavior resembles
the tactics of militant democracy. Here, I do not mean the literal
military occupation of the South. 394 Rather, the term “militant
democracy” was coined by Karl Loewenstein as fascist and communist
governments gained power in Europe in the l930s. According to
Loewenstein, liberal democracies must sometimes take steps to protect
themselves from antidemocratic forces that participate in the political
process. 395 Loewenstein’s theory has received renewed scholarly
attention in response to recent threats to both established and
emerging democracies. 396 Militant democracy adopts an array of
tactics, but a common one is banning political parties that endorse
secessionist, racist, or antidemocratic ideas. 397 For its part, the United
States adopted a militant-democracy strategy in its de-Nazification and
de-Baathification campaigns in Germany and Iraq, respectively. 398
During Reconstruction, the Democratic Party endorsed
secessionist, racist, and antidemocratic ideas and actions. Although
the Reconstruction Congress, where Republicans held massive
majorities, did not outright ban the Democratic Party, it took several
analogous actions to weaken it.
For starters, the Reconstruction Congress excluded the Southern
States that had sent slates of traitors to Washington, DC. Although the
394 Of course, the military and Congress’s war powers were essential in implementing
congressional reconstruction. See DOWNS, supra note 314, at 218 (arguing that “[r]atifying
the Fifteenth Amendment depended upon the war powers” given the fundamental
conditions placed on Virginia, Mississippi, Texas, and Georgia); id. at 202–03 (making a
similar argument for the Fourteenth Amendment).
395 See Karl Loewenstein, Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights, I, 31 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 417, 422–23 (1937); Karl Loewenstein, Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights, II,
31 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 638, 656–58 (1937).
396 See, e.g., Gregory H. Fox & Georg Nolte, Intolerant Democracies, 36 HARV. INT’L L.J.
1, 59 (1995) (arguing that a democracy “may defend itself against anti-democratic actors”);
Tom Ginsburg, Aziz Z. Huq & David Landau, The Law of Democratic Disqualification, 111
CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2023) (manuscript at 50–51), https://ssrn.com/abstract
=3938600 (discussing the pros and cons of employing militant democracy as a response to
the 2020 election); Samuel Issacharoff, Fragile Democracies, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1405, 1467
(2007) (“Virtually all democratic societies define some extremist elements as beyond the
bounds of democratic tolerance.”)
397 See, e.g., Rivka Weill, Secession and the Prevalence of Both Militant Democracy and Eternity
Clauses Worldwide, 40 CARDOZO L. REV. 905, 938–43 (2018) (discussing bans on secessionist
parties).
398 See FREDERICK TAYLOR, EXORCISING HITLER: THE OCCUPATION AND
DENAZIFICATION OF GERMANY 253–54 (2011); Shane Harris, The Re-Baathification of Iraq,
FOREIGN POL’Y (Aug. 21, 2014), https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/08/21/the-rebaathification-of-iraq/ [https://perma.cc/F9L4-MS5H].
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Republican Party constituted a quorum notwithstanding this action,
the exclusion was essential for the passage of the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments, though not necessarily the Fifteenth. And
as I have flagged previously, the First Reconstruction Act and the
Fourteenth Amendment both contain seeds of militant democracy. 399
The First Reconstruction Act disenfranchised ex-rebels, a move that
helped create black electoral majorities in some Southern States. 400 In
addition, Section Three of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited
rebels who had previously sworn an oath to defend the Constitution
from holding federal or state office—a paradigmatic political right—
absent a two-thirds congressional amnesty. 401 The impact was
purposefully decapitating: “the Amendment made virtually the entire
political leadership of the South ineligible for office.” 402 The use of
fundamental conditions regarding black male suffrage and the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments could further be viewed as
attempts to preserve the gains of the war and prevent backsliding.
The Reconstruction Congress was not merely interested in
punishing the former rebels—it also enfranchised black voters. In this
way, the Reconstruction Congress’s actions are less similar to militant
democracy and are more comparable to political process theory, albeit
with a twist.
In footnote four of Carolene Products, the Court questioned laws
that “restrict[] those political processes which can ordinarily be
expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation.”403 Building
off this insight, John Hart Ely argued that courts should step in to keep
the “channels of political change” open. 404 He pointed to the Court’s
one-person, one-vote cases as prime examples of his theory in

399 See Crum, Superfluous, supra note 3, at 1590 n.260.
400 See supra notes 89–100 and accompanying text.
401 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 3. Indeed, Section Three became a flashpoint in
Georgia’s readmission saga. See supra subsection II.B.3.
402 FONER, supra note 50, at 259.
403 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
404 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 103
(1980).
Ely’s scholarship has spawned a vast academic literature. See, e.g., Guy-Uriel E. Charles
& Luis E. Fuentes-Rohwer, Judicial Intervention as Judicial Restraint, 132 HARV. L. REV. 236
(2018); Ryan D. Doerfler & Samuel Moyn, The Ghost of John Hart Ely, 75 VAND. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2022), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3970932; Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H.
Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643
(1998); Pamela S. Karlan, John Hart Ely and the Problem of Gerrymandering: The Lion in Winter,
114 YALE L.J. 1329 (2005); Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process
Theory, 77 VA. L. REV. 747 (1991); Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, The Anti-Carolene Court,
2019 SUP. CT. REV. 111; Aaron Tang, Reverse Political Process Theory, 70 VAND. L. REV. 1427
(2017).
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practice. 405
In addition, he argued for an antidiscrimination
justification for judicial review, with protections for blacks as his “core
case.” 406 Ely’s goal was to resolve the countermajoritarian difficulty—
that is, how to reconcile judicial review with democratic principles—
with
a
“participation-oriented,
representation-reinforcing
approach.” 407 Accordingly, Ely’s account is court centric. 408
Like political process theory, the Reconstruction Framers had
anti-entrenchment and antidiscrimination motivations. However, the
Reconstruction Framers operated through the political branches—not
the courts. 409 By enfranchising black men in the South, Congress made
the Southern States more republican than they had ever been before.
By ensuring that the Confederate leadership would not return to
power either in state capitols or in Washington, Congress helped
preserve the Union and democracy against antidemocratic forces. And
it was Congress that understood that the ballot would empower black
voters to defend their civil rights and advocate for their interests. Once
Grant won the presidency, the executive branch helped combat the
Klan and protect black voters in the South. 410 And, of course, the
Reconstruction Amendments would not have been ratified but for the
actions of dozens of state legislatures.
Reconstruction might also appear like an extreme example of
constitutional hardball. 411 As defined by Mark Tushnet, constitutional
hardball includes “political claims and practices . . . that are without
much question within the bounds of existing constitutional doctrine
and practice but that are nonetheless in some tension” with
405 ELY, supra note 404, at 120–24. For a recent discussion of one-person, one-vote
cases and how that doctrine’s open questions may impact the 2020 redistricting cycle, see
Travis Crum, Deregulated Redistricting, 107 CORNELL L. REV. 359, 374–80, 399–400, 428–34
(2022).
406 ELY, supra note 404, at 148.
407 See id. at 87.
408 See id. at 103–04. In focusing on the countermajoritarian difficulty, Ely was
responding to Alexander Bickel’s work. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16–17 (1962).
409 By contrast, Ely believed that “[o]bviously our elected representatives are the last
persons we should trust” with deciding whether “the political market[] is systemically
malfunctioning.” ELY, supra note 404, at 103.
410 See Travis Crum, Federalizing the Voting Rights Act, 74 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 323,
326 (2021) (discussing the Grant Administration’s role in Reconstruction); see also generally
Lisa Marshall Manheim, Presidential Control of Elections, 74 VAND. L. REV. 385 (2021)
(arguing that presidential involvement in elections raises serious legitimacy questions).
411 See Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Hardball, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 523, 523 (2004);
see also JOHN F. KOWAL & WILFRED U. CODRINGTON III, THE PEOPLE’S CONSTITUTION: 200
YEARS, 27 AMENDMENTS, AND THE PROMISE OF A MORE PERFECT UNION 117 (2021) (“It is
clear that the South’s recalcitrance justified the Radical Republicans’ exercise in
‘constitutional hardball.’”).
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preexisting constitutional norms. 412 Hardball arguments, in other
words, push the legal envelope. 413 To play hardball is to “play[] for
keeps.” 414 Politicians playing hardball are seeking to entrench
themselves in “power [through] new institutional arrangements.”415
In this way, constitutional hardball is “associated with constitutional
transformation.” 416
At first glance, Reconstruction resembles constitutional hardball.
The Radical Republicans were certainly playing for keeps, pushing the
legal envelope, and creating a new constitutional order. But in my
view, Reconstruction differs from constitutional hardball in three key
ways. First, although constitutional hardball is associated with
constitutional change, that transformation occurs within the existing
document. 417 Politicians playing constitutional hardball are not
seeking to change the Constitution through the Article V process.
Second, Reconstruction went well beyond hardball given the sheer
amount of violence in the Deep South and the use of the Union Army.
Finally, democracy-enhancing reforms may not be characterized as
hardball at all, but rather as antihardball. 418 Radical Republicans
openly recognized that extending—and safeguarding—the franchise
to black men would empower them and help protect their civil
rights. 419 Put differently, constitutional hardball is normally a vice, not
a virtue.
In sum, the Reconstruction Framers’ tactics bear a strong—but
not perfect—similarity to contemporary constitutional theories such as
412 Tushnet, supra note 411, at 523; see also Joseph Fishkin & David E. Pozen, Essay,
Asymmetric Constitutional Hardball, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 915, 920–21 (2018) (“A political
maneuver can amount to constitutional hardball when it violates or strains conventions for
partisan ends.” (emphasis omitted)).
413 See Tushnet, supra note 411, at 531 (noting that “hardball arguments are not
frivolous”).
414 Id. at 523.
415 Id. at 533.
416 Id. at 532.
417 See id. at 526–28 (discussing examples such as mid-decade redistricting, aggressive
use of the filibuster, and impeachment).
418 See David E. Pozen, Essay, Hardball and/as Anti-Hardball, 21 N.Y.U. J. LEG. & PUB.
POL’Y 949, 953 (2019) (arguing that “[v]oting rights reforms would serve an anti-hardball
function”). Alternatively, one could frame such actions as a justifiable or beneficial form
of constitutional hardball. See Joseph Fishkin & David E. Pozen, Reply, Evaluating
Constitutional Hardball: Two Fallacies and a Research Agenda, 119 COLUM. L. REV. ONLINE 158,
171 (2019) (“[C]onstitutional hardball that operates by improving the system of democratic
representation, such as by enfranchising people who ought to be enfranchised but have not
been, may be especially defensible.”); see also Tushnet, supra note 411, at 536 (arguing that
the VRA qualifies as an example of constitutional hardball).
419 See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 983 (1869) (statement of Sen. Ross) (“The
ballot is as much the bulwark of liberty to the black man as it is to the white.”); see also Crum,
Reconstructing, supra note 5, at 306–09 (collecting additional sources).
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militant democracy, political process theory, and constitutional
hardball.
CONCLUSION
Consistent with its broader erasure from constitutional law, the
Fifteenth Amendment has been virtually absent from the great debate
over the lawfulness of the Reconstruction Amendments. This Essay has
filled this gap in the literature and, in so doing, has problematized
some of the leading theories concerning the Reconstruction
Amendments’ ratifications. In particular, this Essay has shown that at
least one question left unanswered about the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments must be resolved: namely, whether
rescissions are valid; whether a Northern rump state legislature’s
ratification is acceptable; and whether a Reconstructed Southern State
can be kicked out of the Union and required to ratify an amendment
for its second readmission. Given the political math, it is more difficult
for the loyal- and reduced-denominator theories to sidestep these
questions. Furthermore, this Essay has argued that Ackerman’s
constitutional-moment theory cannot treat the election of 1868 as its
consolidating event.
Stepping back from the legalistic debate, this Essay has argued
that extraordinary measures were both necessary and justified for the
Reconstruction Amendments’ ratifications. This lesson reverberates
today as our democracy is under attack from forces that deny the
results of elections and disregard the peaceful transition of power. It
is therefore appropriate to look to our own past to understand what
was required to achieve a true democracy. After all, democracy is a
fine form of government and worth fighting for. 420

420 Cf. ERNEST HEMINGWAY, FOR WHOM THE BELL TOLLS 467 (1940) (“The world is a
fine place and worth fighting for . . . .”).
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APPENDIX
Below I have constructed a timeline of the Fifteenth
Amendment’s ratification, which keeps a running count of
ratifications under the various theories. The necessary numerators are
twenty for the loyal-denominator theory, twenty-five or twenty-six for
the reduced-denominator theory (depending on Georgia), and
twenty-eight for the full-denominator theory. The numbers in the
parentheses show the count if New York’s rescission is valid. 421

421 For the dates, see GILLETTE, supra note 5, at 84–85 tbl.2. For States that rejected
the amendment on multiple occasions, I have opted to include only the first rejection. For
States that rejected the amendment and then ratified the amendment, I have included only
the acceptance.

3/5/69
3/5/69
3/5/69
3/11/69
3/11/69

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Loyal

Loyal

Loyal

Loyal

Readmitted

Michigan

Wisconsin

Maine

South Carolina

Illinois

3/4/69

Yes

Readmitted

North Carolina

3/3/69

Yes

Loyal

West Virginia

3/1/69

Yes

Readmitted

Louisiana

Date
3/1/69

Loyal

Nevada

Ratify?
Yes

Status

State

9

8

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

Reduced Count

9

8

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

Full Count

Irregularities
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03/12/69
03/15/69
03/18/69
03/25/69
04/14/69
05/13/69
05/14/69
06/14/69

Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Loyal

Readmitted

Loyal

Loyal

Loyal

Loyal

Loyal

Readmitted

Massachusetts

Arkansas

Delaware

Pennsylvania

New York

Connecticut

Indiana

Florida

03/12/69

No

Loyal

Kentucky

Date

Ratify?

Status

State

16

15

14

13

12

11

11

10

9

Reduced Count

16

15

14

13

12

11

11

10

9

Full Count

Rump state
legislature

Later
Rescinded

Irregularities
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10/20/69
11/16/69
11/16/69

Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Rescind
Yes
Yes
Yes

Rebel

Loyal

Readmitted

Readmitted

Loyal

Loyal

Loyal

Rebel

Virginia

Vermont

Alabama

Tennessee

New York

Missouri

Minnesota

Mississippi

15 (14)

15 (14)

14 (13)

13 (12)

13

13

13

12

12

Loyal Count

20
20 (19)
21 (20)
22 (21)
23 (22)

19 (18)
20 (19)
21 (20)
21 (20)

20

19

18

17

Full Count

19

19

18

17

17

Reduced Count

Fundamental
Condition

Rescission

Fundamental
Condition

Irregularities

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

01/17/70

01/13/70

01/07/70

01/05/70

10/08/69

07/01/69

Yes

Loyal

Date

New
Hampshire

Ratify?

Status

State
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Ratify?
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

Status

Loyal

Loyal

Loyal

Loyal

Loyal

Rebel

Rebel

Loyal

Loyal

State

Rhode Island

Kansas

Ohio

Iowa

California

Texas

Georgia

Nebraska

Maryland

20 (19)

20 (19)

19 (18)

19 (18)

19 (18)

19 (18)

18 (17)

17 (16)

16 (15)

Loyal Count

26 (25)

26 (25)

25 (24)

25 (24)

25 (24)

25 (24)

24 (23)

23 (22)

22 (21)

Reduced Count

30 (29)

30 (29)

29 (28)

28 (27)

27 (26)

27 (26)

26 (25)

25 (24)

24 (23)

Full Count

2nd
Readmission

Fundamental
Condition

Irregularities
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01/27/70
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No
Yes

Loyal

Loyal

Oregon

New Jersey

Ratify?

Status

State

02/15/71

10/26/70

Date

21 (20)

20 (19)

Loyal Count
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27 (26)

26 (25)

Reduced Count

31 (30)

30 (29)

Full Count

Postproclamation

Postproclamation

Irregularities
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